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Some 19)1.J. Statutury Ch.:.mg us 
1. V#2-19 omits Aprill3(Thomas--Jefferson Day), June 3(Jefferson Davis Day), October 
l2(Columbus Day), and Nove.mber ll(Arm.i.stice Day) from the list of l egal holidays . 
;: , The distillction between land lying west o:f the Alleghany Mountains and east there-
of has been abolished. The statute of limitations is now 15 yea rs thll(oughout the 
s t,tt8 on motions for l and adversely held by another. (V/18-5) J 
J ~ Vf/B-24. ThEJ limitation on actions for personal injuries(not death by wrongful act) 
is changed from one to two years. 
4. V#S-38 which is -~r general v enue statuto provid~s tha t actions against non-
residents, a rising out of oper ation of motor v ehicles, c an be brought in the ~ounty 
e;r. city in which the plafntif'f resides, or where the ca us E.: o.f action .<J.ris es. 
5 . V//8'-122 which d eals .with a motion t o strike an answer vms amended t o prvvide that 
the tes t of the sufficiency of any defensive pleading in equity shall bo m.:.tde by D.. 
motion t o strike out. . 
6. V#R-122.1 permits a .defendant to int~Jduce evidenc e in all ca s es after his motion 
to strika has been over-ruled . 
7• V#S-188 et s eq. r equire a panel of 11 when the jury is composed of five ~ersons 
and a panel of 13 w~en the jury is comp~sed of 7 persons. This gives each side 3 
per emptory challenges . 
8. V#8-244 provides tha t tht: filing of plaintiff's action tolls the statute of 
litni t ations on defendant 1 s counterclaims or cross-cla ims .~ris :Lng out of the same 
tra nsaction. 
9 . V#B-277.1. Photographs and copies of hospit:J.1 r ecords and papers have been made 
admissible in evidcnc ~ . 
10. V#8-628 .1 provides t h.9.t no causr; of ·3.ctiol1 f or injuries t o a person or property 
sh.<J.ll be l os t becaus e of the doi'..th of' tht~ person li2.blo or the death of . the person 
· injured. Thus if :0 injures ·.p :~nd D di (:)s, or P dies from u.:n independent cause .the 
action do es not aba.t e . Th0 statute o.f limitations is ext ended t o two years. 
11. V/{11-9.1 provides that ,'l power of 2.ttc rney may be ~-1ritten s o as not t o t erminat e 
on disability of tht: principal. Noi..e the l :.:mguago is 11 disability11 a nd not 11 death11 • 
12. Vl/13-19 .1 authoriz es corporation::; t l, rrt:.:lk e donations fo r c crt:1.in charita ble 
purposes . 
13. V#l7 -83 .4 ot s oq. permits the filing of "mast er docJs :) f trust" and the incor-
poration thereof by refer ence in subs equent de~cls. 
14. V#l5-75.l .prohibits compulsory t ests for drunkenness but if a person desires 
s uch a t est he is ontitled to r ec eivG the full assistanc e of the arresting authoritie: 
in obtaining it, and the results of such t ost arc made admissibl e in evidence . · 
15. V//18-32 9 permits the operation of motion picture theat res on Sunday . 
16. V//18-348 prohibits the abandonment of an i c e bo.x ,which may become locked. 
1'1. V/119-168 provides th:tt a person cha r ged with <l misdemeanor and releas ed under 
bail or r ecognizance and who f ails to appear is deemed to hwe waived a . tria l by 
jury and may be triea in abs entia upon a pl(~a of rot gu:i_lty. 
18. V//19-186 was ,'3.1'nenq_ell so that counties h e-wing 2.. population of more than 95,000 
a re exempted from the 'requirement t~1at no per son r esiding within two miles of where 
a f elony is alleged t o hnve b,.:: er. committC::d is eligible to serve a s · a juror in the 
trial of the ca se . 
19. V/fl9-2l+l. l makus Trial Justia us a nd t hoir clerks rtnd officers issuing wa rrants, 
incompetent to tustify in civil c a s es t o tho s rune extent as in crimina l C3.ses. 
20. Vf/26-7 .1 et s r.;q. provi.de that the clerk of a court in which a fiduciary-qualifies _ 
s hall be deemed to h.we b0en des ignat Gd to ruceiv8 s orvic e of proc es s when the party 
cannot be s erved , aft or due diligrmc e . 
21. V/134-2 9 has incrr~as c' :~ t he minimum exemption of tho wages for the head of a 
family to :noo per month. 
2~. V#46-209.l makes it r eckless Jri ving por s c t o Jriv0 at th0 spe0d of 75 miles 
J?et, 'hour or ovur . 
23. 'V,//57-12 was amended to purmit tho trustc;;es of r eligious societies t o hol d per-
son,ity up t o the va l ue of two rni:Llirm dollars .(Old limit was $250 , 000 ) 
2h. V!/-63-358 provides th1.t 'l.clOpt ed c h:i.luren s hall not int,<Jri t from and through t heir 
nat ural parent s except t hat .:1 chi l d -:tcloptGJ by its step-parent shall inherit from 
.its natura l pa r ent .It o. l so proviJ EJS t L:1t if an adopt ::;u child diGs intest at e the 
-- property of s uch adopt e:J. child shall pass as if hu we;re tho natura l l egitimat e child 
of his auopt i vo p::tr 8nts . . 
1956 LEGISLA.'I'IVE CHA NGES Dec. / , 
The new corporation laws do not go into effect until January 1, 1957, so they are 
~"J.o ·i:, covered in this summary. The materials on Corporations will be revised for the 
tiune 1957 examination in the light of the new law. 
It would be foolish frcm the standpoint of the bar examinations to do more than 
note the most significant statu.tory changes a brief summary of which follows: 
Vrf.6-)).l provides for survivorship in .the case of joint tank accounts which are in 
t he name ·of a husband and wife. 
Vl/6-2"(9 permits Small Loan companies to lend up to ;;~600 to an individual. The 
former maximum was ;$300. 
V#6-361 amends section 9 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments law in that it now 
provides that an instrument is also payable to bearer when H is payable to the 
order of a fictitious .or non-existing or living person not intended to have any 
i nterest in it, and SllCh fact was known to the person making it so payable, £!to 
his employee ~ otr~ ~en~ who supplied the ~ of Sllch payee. 
Wf.B-67 .1 authorizes service on Commi ssioner of Hotor. Vehicles as agent of a non-
r es i dent motor vehicle operator for dama~es done anywhere in this Commonwealth 
r ather than only ~ ~ !_lighwa:y. 
W/8-220( as amended in 1954) provides that no 1party shall be allowed to suffer a 
nonsuit unless he do so before the jury ret i r e or before the suit or action has been 
submitted to the court for decision or before a motion to s trike the evidence has 
been sustained. 
V#B-289.1 makes information given by patients to any practitioner of any branch 
of the healing arts necessary to enable him to fur1nsh professional car e privileged. 
However, this is follmved by a great big exception, to v1it, "that when the physical 
or mental condition of the patient is at issue in such action, Slli.t or proceeding 
or when a ,judge of a court of r ecord, in the exercise of sound discretion, deems 
such di sclosure necessary to the proper administration of justice, no f act communi-
cated to, or otherwi se l earned by, S J.Ch practitioner in connection with such attend-
ance, examination or treatment shall be privileged anci disclosure may be requir ed." 
V/f l b .l-T(. The jurisdict ional amount for courts not of r ecord has been raised from 
'i~l, OOO to · ~,2 , 000. 1'hey have exclusive original jurisdiction up to and including 
:; ~300 exclusive of ir-terest and attorney 1 s fe es and concurrent jurisdiction from 
.. p300. 0l to :;~2,000. (If more than ::~300 is involved the defendant may remove the case 
to the proper court of r ecord. Vf/16 . l-92) 
V/.118-"15 .1 provides t hat Hhen an accused is ar r ested for any crime involving a 
char ge of intoxication he can demand wi thin two hours of his arrest that a blood 
sample be taken. Not e t hat he cannot be r equired to submit to any test for intoxi-
cation involving an analysis of hi s br eath or any other bodily substance, nor is 
his f ailure to demand a t es t any evidenc e of i ntoxicat i on and such failure shall 
not be subject to comment. 
V#lB-225 .1 makes a "peeping Tom" guilty of a Hli sdemeanor. 
V#l 8-349.5 makes it a Jnisdemeanor f or one to f a il to r elinqui sh a t elephone line 
in f avor of one wishi ng t o place an emer gency call and V#l B-349 .6 al so makes it a 
mi sdemeanor for one fal sely to pr e t end an emer gency in order to get the line . 
V#26-45.l penni t s f iduci ar i ""s to i nvest t heir funds in any type of s ecurity whi ch 
men of prudence, di scr etion and int eJlige11ce mi ght acqui r e or r et ain for their own 
account f or i nvestment (but not f or SIJecul ati on. j 
. . .. .. , . Revised Oct.l9CD Dee..2 
. , ,J 1956 ~GIS!4f:L'.IVE . · C:~~GES V/f,4·14~ p~ovid~~ that no d~f.en~~ ·tj¥> is ~~~ by a contractor who has not obtained 
the eertif~oate required for construction contractors who engage in work costing 
~p20,000 or more may make the defense of illegality unless he affirmatively shows that 
the contractor had notice of the law prior to or at the time of the execution of 
t he contract. 
V#64-l puts a spouse in second place(rather than in fourth place)so far as the 
descent of land is concerned,i.e. immediately after children and/ or descendants of 
children. Note: As a result of this change there will be few(if any) cases in which 
dower or curtesy will be a life estate in the whole rather than in one third. 
V#64-58 which provided that marriage shall revoke a will has been repealed. 
1958 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES. 
1. V#2~10 again makes November 11 a legal holiday(Veterans Day). 
2. V#5-l4.1 et seq. gives pilots of aircraft carrying· passengers for hire powers of 
special policemen and conservators of the peace. Interference with or threat to 
interfere with the operation of such aircraft is a misdemeanor. Venue is in the 
court having criminal jurisdiction in the political subdivision where the plane 
took off before the commission of the offense or where it first landed afterwards, 
or over which the offense occurred. 
3. V#8 .. 24.1 provides for a five year statute of limitations for actions for damages 
based upon fluoridation of public water supplies. 
4. V#8·59 now authorizes process against, or notice to, a domestic corporation if it 
be a city or town, to be served on its attorney or manager in addition to those 
previously designated. 
5. V#8-218 ~ as amended permits a trial judge to direct a verdict where he has granted 
a motion to strike the evidence of one of the parties and the direction is in con-
formity with his ruling on the motion to strike. 
6. V#8-288 makes a husband or wife a competent witness against the other where either 
is charged with forging or uttering or attempt to utt.er a writing bearing the 
aJ.legedly forged signature of the other. 
7. In 1960 the 1958 modification of V#8-293 was repealed. See NUmber 5 of 1960 
legislative changes. 
8. V#8-316.1 et seq. adopts the Uniform Depositions Act, "Whenever any mandate, writ 
or commission is issued out of any court of record in any other state, territory, 
district or foreign jurisdiction, or whenever upon notice or agreement it is re-
quired to take the testimony of a witness in this State, witnesses may be compelled 
to appear and testify in the same manner and by the same process and proceeding as 
may be employed for the purpose of taking testimony in proceedings pending in this 
State" provided that the same privilege is extended by the other jurisdiction to 
persons in this Stateo 
9. v#8-633 through 8-636 dealing with Death by Wrongful Act increased the statutory 
period in which such actions may be brought from one year to two years from the 
death of the injured person, provide that the periods of time a defendant is out of 
1958 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 3 • 
the State and cannot be served in this State shall not be counted as any part of the 
two years, and increase the maximum recovery allowed from $25,000 to $30,000. 
10. V#l3.1-26 as amended makes it unnecessary to give notice of the purpose of a 
stockholders' meeting except in the case of a special meeting. 
11. V#l6.1-162 is amended to permit the judge of a juvenile court to make public the 
name of offenders, the names of their parents, and the nature of the offense, if he 
deems it in the public interest. 
12. V#l6.1-176 makes it possible for juvenile offenders over 14 years of age who are 
guilty of crimes which if committed by an adult could be punished by imprisonment in 
the peni. tentiary for a period of 20 years or more to be indicted for felonies by a 
grand jury and tried in the regular · courts if the Co~nonwealth 1 s Attorney deems such 
action to be in the public interest. 
13. V#lB-70.1 reads, 11 If any person maliciously cause any other person bodily injury 
by means of any acid, lye or other caustic substance or agent, he shall be punished 
by confinement in the penitentiary for life or any term not less than one year.n 
14. Under V#l8-76 if a driver of a car is convicted of a second offense of drunken 
driving within ten years of conviction of his first offense there is a mandatory 
jail sentence and under Vi¥18-77 a mandatory forfeiture of his operator's license for 
three years. In the case of juveniles a finding of not innocent has the same effect 
as one of guilty in the case of adults so far as forfeiture of operator's license is 
concerned. A conviction for drunken driving in any State having similar laws to our 
own, or for violation of a city, town or county ordinance of similar import is 
considered a prior co~iction. 
15. V#l8-187.1 et seq. are new. They provide that anyone who wilfully conceals the 
goods of any store, while still upon the premises, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and that the merchants and his agents or employees who cause the arrest of any sucr1 
person shall not be held civilly liable for unlawful detention, false imprisonment, 
false arrest~ slander, malicious prosecution, or assault and battery if there is 
probable ~e to believe that the person committed wilfull concealment of' goods. 
16. V#l8;220.1 makes it a statutory felony to take, drive or use a motor vehicle not 
his own without the consent of the owner with the intention of temporarily depriving 
the owner of its use and expressly provides that consent of the owner on prior 
~ccasions shall create no presumption of consent on a later occasion. 
17. Vl/18-239.1 makes it perjury for any person with the intent to testify falsely, 
to knowingly give testimony under oath as to any material matter and subsequently on 
another occasion to give conflicting testimony under oath as to the same matter. 
18. V#lB-348.2 makes it a misdemeanor for any person(other than a licensed physican) 
to use any X-ray, or other apparatus employing roentgen rays, in the fitting of shoes. 
19. V#l9-186 as amended now reads, "No person residing within two miles of the place 
where the crime is alleged to have been committed shall be allowed to serve as a 
juror in any felony case in the circuit court of any county; provided, however, that 
the impanelling of such a juror shall not be cause for summoning a new panel, or for 
setting aside a verdict or granting a new trial, unless objection thereto specifi-
cally pointed out is made before the jury is sworn; and provided further, however, 
that such a juror may be ~npanelled and serve in any county having a population in 
excess of ninety-five thousand or in any county· containing a town, the population of 
which is more than half the entire population of the county." 
20. V#20-97 as amended now reads in part, "No suit for annulling a marriage or for 
divorce shall be maintainable, unless one of the parties is domiciled in, and is and 
Legisle.ti ve Changes h • 
. r .:v,; been an actual bona fide resident of this State fo:r:- at least one year preceding 
t h\il commencemsnt of "I!P..e . .suit-;- nor shall any suit for affirming a marriage be main-
t'l.:i.llable_,_ ll:o/.Me···one· of the parties be domiciled in, and is and has been an actual 
bona fide resident of thl.s State at. the time of bringing such suit. For the purposes 
of this section only, if a member of the Armed Forces of the United States has been 
~tationed in this State and has lived with his or her spouse for a period of ona 
year or rnore ~this State next preceding a separation between such parties,and such 
service person and spouse continue to live in this State until and at the time a suit 
fov divorce or legal separation is commenced, then such person and his or her spouse 
shall be presumed to be domiciled in and to have ~een a bona fide resident of this 
State during such period of time. 11 (The last sentence is new) 
21.. V#22-23l.l(new) reads as follows, "In the maintenance of order and discipline, 
and in the exercise of a sound discretio:rf,- a principal or a teacher in a' public 
school or a school maintained by the State1 may admin:i.ster reasonable corporal 
punishment on a pupil under his apthority1 provided he acta in and good faith · ·and 
such punishment is not excessive." 
22. V#Jl-26 et seq.(new)is called the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. Ita provisions are 
too detailed for summary here1 but the reader should know that there is such an act, 
and that by Vl31·34(b) it is not to be construed as providing an exclusi~e method 
for making gifts to_minors. 
23~Section rewritten by 1960 legislature. See 17 of 196~ Legislative changes •. 
24. V#38.1- 64 and 38.1-70.,3 provides that any Q~ the acts set forth below when done 
by a foreign insurance company not 4uthoritzed to do business in this State or when 
done by an tm.authorized broker or agent, shall constitute an appointment by the 
company or agent of the clerk of the Corporation Ct>mmission as its agent for the 
service of processc(l)The issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents 
of this State,(2)the solicitation of applications for such contracta,(3)the collectior 
of premiums or other consideration for such contracts, (4) the transactions of any 
other insurance business in connection with such contracts. 
2$. V#JB.l-381 requires all policies of liability insurance on motor vehicles issued 
in this State to contain provisions undertaking to'pay the insured, any person 
operating the car with the consent of the insured, and. any guest, all sums which 
he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or Joperator of an 
uninsured motor vehicle within certain limitations. If the owner or operator is un-
known he is deemed to be uninsured and may be proceeded against as n John Doe" and 
service of process may be made on "John Doe" by delivery of a copy of the motion 
for judgment to the clerk of the court in which the action is brought. The i nsurance 
company shall be se:tved as at present af may defend It John Doe". 
2..6. V#$5-19 was amended to increase the permissible corpus of Eti~ndthrift trusts from 
$100,000 to $200 1000. 
21. In 19$P Section 169 of the Virginia Constituti on was amended by adding thereto, 
"Tke General Assembly may define as a separate subject of taxation household goods 
and personal effects and may allow the governi ng bodies of counties,cities, and towns 
to exempt or partially exempt such property from taxation. V#$8-82.9.1 passed in 
19$8 expressly gives counties, cities , and towns this privilege starting with the 
tax year of 19$9. 
Revised October 1960 5. 
1958 Legislative Changes. 
~ D o In Benrus Wt.t,oh Co. v. Kirsch, 198 Va. 94, the Fair Trade Act (V#59-l et seq) 
was declared void b'eCiuse in conflict with a later act (the anti-monopoly act--V#59.-
2.0 et seq). In 1958 V#59 .. 8.1 et seq. were enacted. This is a new "Fair Trade Act~u 
Since it is a later act than the anti··monopoly act it will govern in case of con~ 
f'lict. The purpose of -the act is in part •to protect and preserve small business." 
The owner of a trade mark or trade name is allowed to fix minimum retail prices of 
the articles mentioned in the Act. 
29. V#64-57.1 provides that wills of living persons may be lodged for safekeeping 
with clerks of courts having probate jurisdiction where such persons have their 
residences. 
30. V#64-138 was rewritten and now provides that the personal represen~tive of any 
deceased person who had made a written contract to convey land or any interest 
therein may do all things necessary to effect the transfer of such realty to the 
purchaser. 
31. The Congress of the United States has amended sections 1331 and 1332 of Title 28 
so as to substitute $101 000 in place of $3,000 in all cases now requiring at least $3,000 for federal district court jurisdiction. For purposes of citizenship under the 
diversity of citizenship provisions a corporation is deemed a citizen of the State 
by which it is incorporated and of th~ State where its principal place of business is 
located. Where the claim of a plaintiff is adjudged to be under the jurisdictional 
amount(as where he sues in good faith for $12j000 and recovers judgment for $8,000) 
without regard to any counterclaim a Federal District Court may deny costs to the 
plaintiff and impose costs on him jn its discretion. Workm8n's Compensation cases 
brought in state courts can no longer be removed to the federal courts because of 
diversity of citizenship. This ctange places the workmen's compensation cases in 
the same category so far as removal is concerned as cases brought under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, the Jones Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
The more Important Statutory Changes Affecting Bar Examination Subjects--1960 
1. v#6-357 (Negotiable Instruments),n ***But the negotiable character of an 
instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision which * * *(5) 
States that such instrument is secured by a deed of trust referred to therein. 
2. V#8-lll.l(Pl.eading and Practice)ADMISSION OF FACTS AND GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS 
WITHOUT FORMAL PROOF IN CERTAIN CASES~-(a)After commencement of an action a party 
may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter 
of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited with the 
request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request. 
If a plaintiff desires to serve a request within ten days after commencement of the 
action, leave of court, granted with or without notice, must be obtained. Copies of 
the document shall be served with the request unless copies have already been 
furnished. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed 
admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, not less than ten days 
after service thereof or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow 
on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the 
party requesting the admission either (1) a sworn statement denying specifically 
the matters of which an admission is requested or set.ting .forth in detail the reasons 
why he cannot truthfully ·admit or deny those matters or (2}written objections on the 
ground that some or all of the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or 
that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in part, together with a notice 
of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable tjJUe. If written objections to 
a part of the request are made, the remainder of the request shall be answered with-
in the period designated in the request. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of 
the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party deny only a part 
or a qualificati on of a matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify 
Legislative Changes 1960 6. 
so mur.h of it as is true and deny only the remainder. 
(b) Any admission 1nade by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of 
the pending action only and neither constitutes an admission by him for any other 
purpose nor may be used against him in any other proceeding. 
3, V#8-135.l(Liability of infants on loans to defray expenses of higher education). 
This section makes minors sixteen years of age or over liable as if adults for loans 
procured by a representation in writing that the proceeds are to be used to defr~y 
expenses incurred by reason of attendance at an institution of higher education 
which is duly accredited~ 
4. V#8··288 (.Testimony of husband and wife against each other when crime is cormni tted 
against child of either). This reads in part, 11 In the prosecution for a criminal 
offense committed by one against the other or against a minor chi~d of either not , 
over sixteen(formerly 12) years of age or against one charged ~th forgery of the 
name of the other * * * each shall be a competent witness e~ept as to privileged 
communications. 11 . 
5. V#8-293(Contradiction by prior inconsistent writipg).. The 1958 amendment allowing 
admission of ex parte written statements or affidavits in personal injury cases if 
five days prior notice had been given was repea+ed• The following sentence was 
added, "But nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the use of any 
such ex parte affidavit or statement in an action on any insurance policy based upon 
a judgment recovered in a personal injury,.or death by wrongful act case. 11 
/ 
6. V#8-386(When does a judgment for ~ney become a lien on real estate?) This 
section has been rewritten and greytly simplified. It now reads, "Every judgment for 
money rendered in this State by an~ state or federal court or by confession of judg-
ment, as provided by law, sha~ be a lien on all the real estate of or to which the 
defendant in the judgment is. or becomes possessed or entitled, from the time such 
judgment is recorded on tbe judgment lien docket of the clerk's office of the county 
or city where such land ,is situated." 
7• V#B-390 now provides that revived judgments shall not be valid liens on land as 
against purchasers thereof for a valuable considerati on without notice until and 
except from the time that they are duly docketed. 
. / 
8. V#8-654.1 ma.kes the parents of minors under 18 years of age and living at home 
liable to not exceeding the sum of $200 for damages done in any one incident to 
public property as the result of such minor's wilful or malicious injury thereof. 
,. 
9. v#l3.1-435 provides that whenever a security issued by a corporation organized 
~er the laws of Virginia shall be registered in the name of two or more persons 
j6intly, or in the name of a man and woman as tenants by the entireties, in each 
case with right of survivorship , the corporation may treat the survivor or survivors 
1 as owners for all purposes unless such transfer to the survivor has been enjoined. 
This statute appears to be meant to protect the corporation and not to determine the 
ultimate rights of the survivor as against other claimants. 
10. V#l8.1-15.1 makes it a misdemeanor(maxim~~ penalty one year in jail plus a fine 
of $1,000) to conspire to trespass on property after having been forbidden orally, 
in writing, or by sign to do so. V#l8el-173 has similar provisions with r eference 
to the trespassers, and 18.1-173.1 applies to those who instigate such trespasses. 
v'tt 11. In 18.1-227 the legislature attempts to define the wor d "obscene". It means 
uthat which considered as a whole has as its dominant the1ne or purpose an appeal 
to prurient interest, that i s, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or 
excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary l i mits of candor in descrip-
tion or representation of such matters." Violation of the laws about obscenity are 
made misdemeanors. 
Legislative Changes 1960. 7. 
12~ V#lB.l-340.1 declares that in any prosecution for violation of the laws against 
O:Jera·0ing a lottery ''no consideration shall be deemed to have passed or been given 
beea.use of any person's attendance upon the premises of another; his execution, 
mailing or delivery of an entry blank; his answering of questions, verbally or in 
~iting; his witnessing of a demonstration or other proceeding; or any one or more 
thereof, where no charge is made toi paid by, or any purchase required of him in 
connection therwith. 
13. V#lB.l-358 is the amended controversial Sunday law. Read it, but don't try to 
learn it in detail. WORKING OR TRANSACTING BUSINESS ON SUNDAY.--On the first day of 
the week, commonly known and designated as Sunday, it shall be unlawful for any 
person to engage in work, labor or business or to employ others ta.engage in work, 
labor or business except in household or other work of ne0essity or char~ty. The 
exemption for ·~orks of necessity or charity contained in the preceding sentence shall 
not be deemed to include selling at retail or wholesale or by auction, or offering 
or attempting to sell, on Sunday, any of the following: jewelry; precious and semi-
precious stones; silverware; watches, clocks; luggage; musical instruments; record-
ings; toys(excluding items customarily sold as novelties and souvenirs); clothing 
and wearing apparel; clothing accessories; footwear; t9Ktile yard goods; housewares; 
china; kitchenware; home, business, office or outdoor furniture, furnishings and 
appliances; sporting goods(excluding sales or rental of bathing, boating, and fish-
ing paraphernalia and equipment, and sales or rental on the premises where sports, 
athletic events or recreational facilities are located or conducted of equipment 
essential to the normal use or operation of such premises for the purposes specified) 
pets, pet equipnent or supplies; cameras and photographic supplies(excluding film 
and flash bulbs); hardware; tools; paints; building and lumber supplies and materials; 
motor vehicles; trailers(excluding mobile homes); farm implements; lawn and garden 
equipment and supplies; farm produOB(excluding sales of farm produce grown by the 
seller and sold at roadside stands or at the place where grown) or fresh, frozen or 
salt meats, poultry or seafood customarily inedj ble without further cooking or 
preparation(excluding smoked or cured hams). No inference shall arise from the fore-
going enumeration of classes of personal property that sales or offers or attempts 
to sell other classes of personal property not mentioned are included within the 
above eaemption for works of necessity or charity. This section shall not apply to 
furnaces, kilns, plants, wholesale food warehouses, ship chandleries, and other 
business of like kind that may be necessary to be conducted on Sunday, nor to the 
publication, distribution and sale of newspapers or magazines, nor to the sale of 
motor fuels or oils, repair parts or accessories for immediate necessary use in 
connection with motor vehicles, boats or aircraft, nor to the operation of motion 
picture theatres, nor to sports, athletic events, scenic, historic and recreational 
and amusement facilities. 
14. V#l9.1-163.1 (Criminal Procedure) reads:No person who is arrested on a charge of 
felony shBll be denied a preliminary hearing upon the question of whether there is 
reasonable ground to believe that he committed the offense and no indictment shall 
be returned in a court of record against any such person prior to such hearing unless 
such hearing is waived in writing. 
15. V#20-91 (Domestic Relations) subsection(9) adds an additional grounds for 
divorce, namely if both nhusband and wife have lived separate and apart without any 
cohabitation and without interruption for three years, and at the time of separation 
were each resident and domiciled in Virginia:' Divorce on this ground shall not be 
granted where service of process is by publication. 
16. V#20-118 (Domestic Relati ons) does away wi th the f our months' waiting period 
after an absolute divorce before the parties can marry. But if objections or ex-
ceptions are noted or filed to the final decree and a bond is given staying the 
execution thereof, the court shall decree that neither party shall remarry pending 
the perfecting of an appeal. 
Ba 
17. WJ-34-29 again modifies the poor debtors' exemption for householders. Insteadf 
o:: an additional exemption of $15 per child, 75% of a wage earner's salary in 
c;xcess of the minimum $100 per month ex~mp·tion but not in excess of $150 per month 
maximum exemption is made exempt from attachment or garnishment. It is as applicablE" 
to non-resident householders as to resident ones. Non-householders are entitled to 
50 per cent of the wage exemption granted to householders • 
... ~ . 
18~ V#37-125.1 requires those legally liable for the support of dependents in the 
State's Mental hospitals to pay costs of keep not exceeding $125 per month. 
(Formerly $65 per month.) 
lS. V#38ol-363.1 provides that the standard policy of fire insurance shall not 
cover loss .. caused by nuclear reactio.n, radiation, or radioactive contamination, 
whether directly or indrectly resulting frcm an insured peril. However the insurer 
may, if it wishes, add a clause specifically assuming such risks. 
20. V#43-4.l(Recording Acts) provides that on and after July 1, 1960 all memoranda 
or notices of liens or other documents formerly required to be recorded in the 
miscellaneous lien books shall henceforth be recorded in the deed books instead, 
and shall be indexed in the general index of deeds, and such general. index shall 
show the type of such lien. 
21. V#54-66: "Any applicant failing to pass(t.he bar) examination given after July 
15, 1960, may after such failure, be re-examined not exceeding four additional times 
upon showing to the Board that he ha·s diligently pursued the study of law since the 
former examination and that he remains otherwise qualified under the provisions of 
this article". However, the Board, for good cause, may allow an applicant to take 
additional examinations. 
22. By V#55·210.1 et seq. Virginia has adopted "The Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed 
Property Act.n Under its provisions ~nk accounts that have remained inactive for 
17 years, uncaahed obligations of banks such as certificates of deposit, cashiers' 
checks,bank drafts that are 17 years past due, unclaimed contents removed from 
safety deposit boxes for 17 years, public utility deposits unclaimed for 7 years, 
and some other items are presumed to have been abandoned, and eventually become the 
Commonwealth's property unless the owners make claim therefor and prove ownership 
in accordance· with the provisions of this act. 
23. V#64-70 modifies the law with reference to pretermitted children in the follow-
ing situation: If the testator made a will while he had a child or children and 
these are not provided for in the will or by a settlement, and a child be born 
after such will has been made, then such child shall not succeed to any portion of 
testator's estate as there is no reason to prefer such child over the other child 
or children. , 
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Exrunination. 
j _. V#4-15.2 reads in part: "The State tax imposed on alcoholic beverages sold at 
government stores--shall be deemed a tax upon the purchaser thereof.» The object of 
this statute is to make the tax deductible on income tax returns. The amount of the 
t ax is printed beside the price of each item in a separate column. 
2o V#6-54 proTides that when the balance in Sr,..,ny bank or trust company to the crer:iit 
of a deceased person, upon whose estate there shall have been no qualification,shall 
not exceed $l,OOO(formerly $300 and later $500)it shall be lawful for such bank or 
trust company, after 120 days ~m the death of such person, to pay such balance to 
his next of kin~ 
),. V#6-129~1;130 and 131 Iila.ke it a misdemeanor to draw checks for the payment of 
wages when the drawer knows he does not have funds or credit sufficient to take care 
of the check. Moreover, the person so drawing the check is made personally liable 
for the amount thereof. No representations with reference to the check are admiss-
ible unless written on the check. Failure to make the item good within five days 
after notice of its· dishonor constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge the 
check was bad. No action of malicioue prosecution lies against anyone causing the 
arrest of the drawer if there has been presentment, dishonor, notice, and the lapse 
ot five days without the check having been made good. 
4. V#6-577 through 585 provides fo~ the creation of real estate investment trusts. 
Such a trust is defined as a trust created under this act(a)for the primary purpose 
of acquiring ownership of one or more of the following: (l)land and improvements 
thereon and the developnent thereof(2)obligations secured by deeds of trust or other 
lien inBtruments on real estate,(3)personal property incidental to the operation of 
real estate owned by the trust,(4)leases and limited interests in real estate, and 
(b)which provides ih the declaration of trust that the property and business of the 
trust shall be held and managed by trustees who are residents of Virginia and for 
the issuance of transferable certificates of interest. 
Under this Act two or more persons may form a trust by exeeuting1 acknowledging · 
and recording a declaration of trust which shall set forth certain information. 
Creditors of the trust can look only to the assets of the trust. 
The duration of a trust may be unlimited and a trust shall not be deemed to 
violate any rule against perpetuities or accumulations or to unlawfully suspend 
tho power of alienation. 
5. PRIVIlEGED COMMUNICATIONS•MINISTERS. V#8-289.2 provides that no regular minister 
of religion shall be required in any civil acti on to disclose any information 
communicated to him in a confidential manner and in his professional capacity where-
in suoh person so communicating such information about himself or another is seeking 
epiritual counsel relative to the information so imparted. 
6. LIEN OF A CONFESSED JUDGMENT now attaches from the time such judgment is recorded 
on the judgment lien docket of the clerk's office of the county or city in which 
land of the defendant lies, V/18-358 • · 
7 • V#8-653 relating to NOTICE TO BE GIVEN CI TIES AhlD TOWNS OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES 
FOR NEGUGE~E now prov-ides that if the injured party is compos mentis during the 
60 days period 'for giving notice but clearly shows that due to the injury sustained 
he was physically or mentally unable to give such notice, then the time for giving 
zsuch notice shall be tolJJ.ed until the claimant sufficiently recovers so, as to be 
able to give such notice. 
8. By V#8-654.Z an owner, l essee or occupant of premises who gives permission with• 
out consideration tO another person to hunt, f i sh, trap, camp or hike upo~ such 
prsmisee shall owe no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or use by such person 
or to give warning of any hazardous condition. 
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9 .J/JHEN LACK OF PRIVITY NO DEFF.NSE (V#8-654 .3 )-Lack of privity between plaintiff and 
dd endant shall be no defense in any action brou.ght against the manufacturer or sell-
'.::r of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty,express or implied, or for 
~ Legligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the fl500ds from the defendant,if 
·t,he plalntiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have 
m:pee:ted to use, consume, or be affec:t.ed by the goods .n 
10·., Vl/8 .... 636 of our Death by Wrongful Act Statutes increased the maximum allowed from 
$30,000 tQ $35,000. ' . 
11. CORPORATIONS. V#lJ.l-62 was amended to read, •No redemption or purchase of re-
deemable share~ shall be made by a corporation which is insolvent, or when such re-
demption or purchase would render . it insolvent, or which would reduce the net assets 
below the aggregate amount payabte to the holders of shares having prior or equal 
rights to the assets of the cor~ration upon involuntary dissolution .. " 
12. MURDER by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any wilful,delib-
erate, and premeditated killing, or in the comissiori of~ or attempt to commit, 
abduction as defined in V#l8.1-38, arson, rape, robbery or burglary is murder of the 
first degree. All other murder is murder of the second degree. V# 18 .1-21. The under-
lined portion was added in 1962. The abduction referred to is abduction with intent 
to extort pecuniary benefit, or to defile a woman against her will, or of any female 
under sixteen years of age for the P\ll'POSe of concubinage or prostitution, This type 
of abduction is a capital offense. , · 
13. V#18.1·55 through 59 deal with tests of blood samples of those accused of driving 
wbile ·under the influence of alcohol. They provide that any person who operates a 
motor vehicle upon the public highw~y in this State shall be deemed thereby to have -
agreed as a condition of such opera'tion to consent to, and shall be entitled to, 
have a sample of his blood taken for a chemical test to determine the alcoholic con-
tent thereof if he is arrested within two hours of the alleged offense. The statute 
sets forth the procedure that must be followed in detail, and a failure of the 
Commonwealth to comply with each detail is regarded as prejudicial and requires an 
acquittal unless such failure was due to the fault of the accused. Two samples are 
taken, and one of theae is given to the accused so that he can have his own test 
made. If the accused refuses after due warning to permit the test, he may be tried 
for driving under the influence, but the fact of refusal is not admissible in evid-
ence nor can it be corrmented upon. But such a refusal is an independent misdemeanor. 
14. A change in V#l8.1·102 adds a pony to the list of animals the larceny of which 
is a felony regardlahs of their value. 
15. V#lB.l-119.1 makes it a crime to obtain or attempt to obtain credit by the use 
of any false, counterfeit or revoked credit card known to be such by the accused. 
Another section of this statute makes it a crime to obtain telephone or telegraph 
service by any scheme or device with intent to avoid the payment of lawful charges. 
16. V#18.1-119.2 makes it a misdemeanor for any purchaser falsely to represent in 
writing in any contract for the purchase of real estate that the property referred 
to in such contract is intended for use as the personal residence of such purchaser. 
11. V#l8.1-146.l makes it a misdemeanor for any retailer to accept, in payment for 
any food sold by him to a custo~mer, a promissory note or notes for an amount in ex-
c..,. of twice the sales price of food delivered by him to the customer. 
The object of this statute is to break up the practice of selling food for future 
delivery at low prices and f aking notes for same each note being payable at the end 
of a certain month. The customer is told that the notes will not become due until 
after the food is delivered. The seller then discounts the notes with a holder in 
due course who is able to get judgment on the notes even if no food is ever delivered. 
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~e ~ V#lB.l-238.1 makes it a misdemeanor for any person maliciously to advise or in-
f orm another over any telephone in this State of the death of, accident to, injury 
t o, illness of, or disappearance of some third party, knowing the same to be false. 
19. V#lS.l-238.2 makes it a misdemeanor for any person to cause another person's 
-~e lephone to ring without intent to converse but with intent to annoy such other 
person. 
20. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE--V#20-91(9) was amended to read "On the application of eithe:r 
party if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart without any co-
habitation and without interruption for three years. A plea of res adjudicata or of 
recrimination with respect to any other provision of this section shall not be a bar 
to either party obtaining a divorce on this ground.n 
Special note: As a result of this change it is no longer necessary for the parties 
to have been each resident and domiciled in Virginia at the time of their separation, 
and such a divorce may now be granted on service of process by publication if such 
service is otherwise proper. 
21. V#20-l07 provides that the court trying a divorce case may make such further 
decree as it shall deem expedient concerning the estate and maintenance of the 
parties. The 1962 amendment adds, "The word 'estate' as used in this section shall 
be construed to mean only those rights of the parties created by the marriage in 
and to the real property of each other." 
22. Safety Belts--Negligence. V#46.1-309.1 reads, 11 (a)No motor vehicle, designed and 
licensed primarily for private---transportation---and manufactured for the year 1963 
or for subsequent years, shall be approved on inspection---unless the front seats 
thereof be equipped with safety bB~ts---.(b)Failure to use such safety belts---
shall not be deemed to be negligence." 
2). Emergency Medical Care--Negligence. V#54-276.9 reads, "No person licensed to 
practice medicine in this State, who in good faith renders emergency care to any 
person injured as a result of a roadside or highway accident, at the scene of such 
accident, shall be liable for any civil damages as the result of any act or omission 
in rendering such emergency care: provided, however, that no established doctor-
patient relationship between practitioner and injured person pre-existed such 
emergency treatment." 
24. Can Lawyers Incorporat~ No, but consider V#54-87J to 898. These sections deal 
with the formation of Professional Associations. An associate is a member of a 
professional association which is defined as an unincorporated association, as dis-
tinguished from a partnership or corporation, organized under these statutory pro-
visions for the practi ce of architecture, professional engineering, land surveying, 
certified public accounting, dentistry, optornetry, the healing arts, veterinary 
medicine, surgery, and law. 
Any three or more persons holding a valid license for the practice of the same 
profession may organize such an association. They have practically the same powers 
as a corporation including the power of perpetual succession by its association 
name. They may own property~ They have a board of directors and by-laws. Certifi-
cates of ownershi p are given each associate. These may be transferred to any other 
associate, and even to oth~r qualifi ed persons in accordance with the by-laws. No 
associate is liable for the t orts of anyone but himself and those in hi s immediate 
control. The Association, however, is l iable for the ~orts of all its associates 
and employees. The associations are treated as corporations for income tax purposes. 
25. The first sentence of V#S5-6 now reads, "Any i nterest i n, or claim to real 
es tat e, includi ng eas ement~ .:!:!.: gross , may be disposed of by deed or will". The under-
lined wordS were added. 
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~) 6. V#55-l'/.l(New) reads in part, 11 No trust relating to real estate shall fail---be-
cause no beneficiaries are specified by name in the recorded deed of conveyance to 
the trustee or because no duties are imposed upon the trustee. The power conferred 
by any such instrument on a trustee to sell, lease, encumber or otherwise dispose of 
property therein described shall be effective and no person dealing with such a 
trustee shall be required to make further inquiry as to the right of such trustee 
to act nor shall he be required to inquire as to the disposition of any proceeds." 
27. V#ll-9.2(New) reads in part, 11 No agency created by a power of attorney in writ-
ing given .by a principal shall be revoked or terminated by the death or disability 
of the principal as to the agent or other person who, without actual knowledge or 
actual notice of the death of the principal, has acted or acts, in good faith,under 
or in reliance upon such power of attorney or agency, and any action so taken,unless 
otherwise invalid---, shall be binding on the principal or his heirs, devisees, 
legatees or personal representative---"· 
28. HORIZONTAL PROPERTY ACT--V#55-79.l to 55-79.33. The purpose of this act is to 
facilitate the acquisition of ownership of individual apartments. A condominium is 
defined as ownership of single units in a multiple unit structure with common 
elements. A condominium project is one whereby four or more apartments, rooms, offic( 
spaces or other units in existing buildings are offered or proposed to be offered 
for sale. General common elements include the land on which the building stands, 
basements, roofs, elevators, garbage incinerators, central services, etc. Whenever 
a developer or owners of a buildiQg. 'expressly declare, through the recordp.tion of a 
master deed or lease, their desire to submit their property to the regime establish-
ed by this act, there is thereby established a horizontal property regime. Then an 
apartment in the building may be jndividually conveyed and encumbered as if it were 
entirely independent of the other -apartments. The regime may make its own by-laws. 
Each apartment must pay its share for the maintenance of the common elements. 
29. STATE TAXATION. V#58-2?.l authorizes the Governor to enter into reciprocal 
agreements with the authorities of the State of Haryland and of the District of 
Columbia with respect to the collection of all taxes. 
30. STATE TAXATION. V/158-151.1 et seq. provide for withholding income taxes from 
wages and for declarations of estimated income taxes. 
31. V#·64 .. 18 has been amended to expressly provide that no person who has been con-
victed of murder of an insured shall be entitled to life insurance as beneficiary. 
The proceeds are payable as if such murderer had predeceased the insured if there 
is such a provision in tbe policy. If thore is no such provision then it is payable 
to the estate of the insured. An insurance company which makes a payment to the 
murderer without knowledge of the facts is protected from having to pay agaib. 
32. V#64-54 has been amended to read, 11 No person shall, on account of his being an 
executor of a will, ~ ~ trustee appointed thereby, be incompetent as a witness for 
or against the will." 'l'he underlined words are new. 
33. WILLS--TRUSTS. See 197 Va.l45 on p.l718 of the Cases on Wills as V#~+-71.1 
changes the law laid down in that case. It is now provided that a devise or bequest 
in a duly executed will may be made t o the trustee of a trust established in writin[ 
prior to the execution of such will, that such trus t may be an unfunded insurance 
trust with the trustee being the beneficiary under t he insurance contract and with 
the testator having the right to change the beneficiary and/or having any or all 
other rights of or.rnersbip i !l such contract, that for tb.e purposes of this section, 
an unfunded insurance tr~1st shall be deemed esta.blished upon execution of the 
instrument creating such trust, that such devis.e or bequest shall not be invalid be-
cause the trust i.s amendable or revocable or because the trust instrument or any 
amendment thereto was not executed in the manner required for -wills or because the 
trust was amended after t he execution of the will, and that the property so devised 
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or bequeathed shall be subject to the terms of the trust as they appear in writing 
at the testator's death by becoming a part of any corpus then in the trust. 
34. VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION. V#32~423 et seq. deal with voluntary sterilization. 
Under these statutes if a person over 21 years of age requests to be sterilized, 
if ilis or her spouse also consents, .if the consequences of the operation are fully 
explained, if there is at least a 30 day waiting period in which the party so re-
questing 1nay withdraw his consent)if the operation is performed by a licensed 
doctor in collaboration with another licensed doctor, and if the operation is per-
formed in a li~nsed hospital in this State, then such an operation may be legally 
performed without civil or criminal ~iability other then under the general law of 
negligence. ; 
If the person upon whom the operation is to be performed is under 21 years of age 
there are additional requirements. 
1964 ~egislative Changes of Particular Interest to 
Those Stutlyihg fo~ the Bar Examinations. 
J.. Ch. 219 enacts the Uniform Commerical Code and repeals many sections of the Code 
inconsistent therewith. But since the Code and the repeals do not become effective 
until January 1, 1966, and then apply only to transactions entered into after that 
date, these matters are omitted for the present. In the meantime bar examination 
questions answered as per present law or as per the UCC are acceptable under the 
present policy of the Board. 
2. (Judgment Liens) V#B-386 as amended in 1960 and again in 1964 makes judgments 
liens on real property effective from the time such liens are recorded(docketed) on 
the judgment lien docket of the clerk's office of the county or city wherein such 
land is located. Note well that this radically changes the law in at least two 
respects, (1) The principle that docketing is unnecessary as between creditors is no 
longer law, and (2) in the case of matured. causes at the same term of court the lien 
of judgments no ]onger relate back so as to commence as of the first day of the term. 
However, in the case of a docketed revived judgment, while the revived judgment is 
uneffective until docketed, upon re-docketing, it becomes effective as of the date 
of the docketing of the original judgment. Furthermore no redocketing is necessary 
as a result of a city annexing county lands. 
3. V#'B-24.2 provides that no action for damages for injury to property or person or 
for a wrongful death arising out of an unsafe condition of an improvement to real 
property shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, 
planning or construction of such improvement more than five years after the furnis~ 
ing of such service or construction. However, this limitation does not apply to 
actions against any person in actual possession or control as owner, tenant, or 
otherwise at the time the unsafe condition constitutes the proximate cause of the 
injury. 
4. New sections V#8-81.1 et seq. give Virginia Courts "long armn· personal juris-
diction even against non-residents who do certain acts which give persons in Virginia 
vauses of action against them. These sections are cumulative and deprive no one of 
any rights he may have had before ti:wir enactment. They cover seven types of acts 
as follows: 
(1) Transacting any business in this Statal 
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this State; 
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this State; 
(4) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission outside this State 
if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course 
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 
rendered, in this State; (5) Causing injury in this State to any person by breach of warranty expressly or 
impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this State when he might reasonably have 
expected such persoh to use, consume, . or be affacted by the goods in this State, pro-
vided that he also regularly does or solicits busi ness, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or 
consumed or services rendered in this State; 
(6) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State; or 
(7) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State 
at the time of contracting. 
The venue of such actions is governed by the general venue statute(VIB-38), but if 
no provision thereof is applicable it is where plaintiff resides or where the cause 
of action or any part thereof arose. Service of process may be made on the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth who, for tl:ds purpose, shall be deemed to be the 
statutory agent of the defendant. 
1964 Legislative Changes 15. 
5. V#8-157(a) relating to removal of causes from one court to another court has been 
amended to read:~A circuit, corporati6n or city court wherein a suit, motion, or 
other civil proceeding is pending, or the judge thereof in vacation, may, on motion 
by any party, after twenty days' notice to the adverse party or his attorney, and 
for good cause shown, order any suit, motion, or otper civil proceeding pending 
therein, to be removed to any other court having j~isdiction o~ the subject matter. 
Good cause shall be deemed to includeJ but ndt to bS l~ted to, the avoidance of 
inconvenience to the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice•" 
6. V#8u200 relating to the number of peremptory challenges allowed where the jury 
consists of either of five or seven now limits the number of such challenges to 
three on each side even though there be more than one plaintiff or defendant. 
7. V#S-293 relating to impeachment of witnesses by means of a prior inconsistent 
written statement has been amended to provide that no extra-judicial recording of a 
voice of a witness or reproduction or transcript thereof may be used to contradict 
a witness in a personal injury or death by wrongful act case. 
8. V#8-305 relating to the taking of depositions has been amended to allow deposi-
tions to be taken before any consul or commissioned officers of the armed services 
of the United States. 
9. V#B-313, relating to the circumstances under which a deposition may be read, 
now includes the case where 11a physician, surgeon or dentist, who in the regular 
course of his profession treated or examined any party to the proceeding, and whose 
office is more than twenty-five miles from the place of trial." 
10. V#B-357 which has to do with the setting aside of judgments by confession now 
provides that the judgment debtor may move to set aside such a judgment within 21 
days after notice to him of entry of such judgment and after notice to his judgment 
creditors. 
11. Suppose an appellant who desires to take his case to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals does everything required of Lim, but a clerk fails to do his part, will the 
appeal fail? A new paragraph has been added to V#B-489 which reads in part as 
follows "***no appeal, writ of error or supersedeas shall be refused or dismissed 
for failure to deliver the record within the required time if it shall appear from 
evidence satisfactory to the Supreme Court of Appeals that the clerk of the court 
below failed to deliver to the clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals the record on 
appeal within the required time after having been notified to do so in accordance 
with the provisions of the rules of court of the Supreme Court of Appeals." 
12. p is injured as a result of D's negligence. P dies from a heart attack not 
connected with the injury several months later. P's personal representative there-
after sues D. Is he entitled to recover damages for P's mental anguish, pain .and 
suffering? V#8-628.l(not retroactive) which provides for the survival of personal 
actions was changed so as to allow the recovery of such damages. Note: If P had 
died as a result of D's negligence then such damages cannot be recovered, but the 
mental anguish of his statutory beneficiaries(rather than that of P) is a proper 
matter to be considered in determing damages under the death by wrongful act 
statutes. 
13. p was injured. He was thereafter interviewed by X, an employee of an insurance 
company. What P stated was recorded by X. Is P entitled to a copy of the trans-
cribed recording? V#B-628.2 as rewritten no~ reads: Any person who takes from a 
person who has sustained a personal injury a signed written statement or voice re-
cording of any statement relative to such injury shall deliver to such injured 
person a copy of such written statement forthwith or a verified ~ed transcription 
of such recording within thirty days from the date such statement was given or 
recording made1 when and if the statement or recording is transcribed or in all 
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cases when requested by the injured person or his attorney. 
14. A new section, V#8-825.1, permits counties and cities to designate storage areas 
so that the personal property of ejected tenants can be taken from the streets and 
stored in the designated area all at the expense of the tenant owner. It also pro-
vides for the sale of such property after proper notice in the event these charges 
are not paid within the time allowed. 
15. Virginia's Implied Consent Law has been rewritten. The gist of this 1aw(now 
V#l8.1-55.1) is that any person driving a car on the public highways gives his con-
sent in the event he is arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants 
to the withdrawal of a blood sample unless he refuses to do so in a signed writing 
on a form furnished by the Chief Medical Examiner. If a defendant refuses to permit 
the taking of a sample without good reason his license is subject to revocation. He 
is entitled to a trial on such an issue. Detailed and elaborate directions as to 
the taking and testing of the blood sampl~s(one of which is given to the accused) 
are set forth. But the failure to comply with these directions no longer requires 
acquittal, but only goes to the weight of the evidence. Blood sample evidence does 
not preclude the admission of any other competent evidence. Accused need not sign 
any form releasing those who take his blood from liability. 
16. V#l8.1-131.1 does not make ordinary advertisements offers, but does make it a 
criminal offense to offer for sale to the public any merchandise, service or thing 
with intent not to sell, or with intent not to sell at the price or upon the terms 
advertised unless the advertisement clearly states that there is only a limited 
supply and the advertiser in fact has such a supply. A refusal to sell as above is 
prima facie evidence of the criminal intent. 
17. X offered $50,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of 
the person or persons who murdered M. A sheriff furnished this information in line 
of his duty. Is he entitled to the reward? Yes. Chapter 1'(1 of the 1964 Acts of 
Assembly after first pointing out that sheriffs and sergeants and other law enforce-
ment officers often work diligently far beyond the call of duty to apprehend 
criminals, and that the case of Buck v. Nance, 112 Va.28(19ll) held that it .was 
against public policy to allow law v4~orcement officers to claim or receive rewards, 
and that this policy has already been changed by statutes(V#-15.1-138 and 52-10) in 
the case of police officers of cities and towns, enacts, "Any sheriff, deputy 
sheriff, sergeant, deputy sergeant or any other officer may claim and receive any 
reward which may be offered for the arrest and detention(sic)of any offender against 
the criminal laws of this or any _other Commonwealth or nation." V//19.1-6.1. 
18. V#l9.1-186.2 is new, and reads, 11\<fuen any person is found guilty of a traffic 
offense, the court or jury trying the case may consider the pri or traffic record 
of the defendant before imposing sentence as provided by law. After the prior 
traffic record of the defendant has been introduced, the defendant shall be afforded 
an opportunity to present evidence limited. to showing the nature of his prior 
convictions, suspensions and revocations. 
19. H and W, husband and wife, hav9 lived separately for t1'lenty five months as a 
result of H's cruelty. At the end of a year from the separation H applied for a 
divorce but the Court refused to grant him one. H then lived in adultery with X. 
H is now seeking a divorce against W for a second time. What decree? Decree for H 
as V#20-91 as amended in 1964 now reads nA divorce from the bond of matrimony may 
be decreed:(9)0n the application of either party if and when the husband and wife 
have lived separate and apart without any cohabitation and without interruption for 
two years. A plea of res adjudicata or of recrimination ~~ shall not be a bar to 
either party obtaining a divorce on this ground.'' 
. L~g;islati ve Changes P .: 1 
20. Who is privileged to dtive mdtor -ltehieies in excess of the speed limit? By V# 
46.1-199~ 
(1) The police when operating vehicles with due regard for safety{a)in the chase or 
apprehension of criminals or suspected criminals (b)or in the testing of the 
accuracy of speedometers on police ~ehicles or of the . radio microwave; {2) the 
operators of fire department vehicles when travelling in response to a fire alarm or 
pulmotor call;(3)ambulances when travelling in emergencies outside the corporate 
limits of cities and towns---all provided the cars are equipped with flashing red 
lights and sirens. However, no civil or criminal immunity is extended to the 
drivers of such vehicles for the negligent operation thereof. 
21. V#46.1-351.1 and 351.2 have been added. They provide for the forfeiture to the 
Commonwealth of any car which is being driven by a person whose driver's license 
has been revoked during the period of such revocation. There are provisions pro-
tecting innocent owners and lienors. 
22. X died testate in A County. He owned land in B County. Should X's will or an 
authenticated copy ther~of be recorded in the Will Book of B County? Yes, and it 
should be indexed in the Deed Book alsov The second paragraph of V#64-90 now reads, 
»The personal representative of the testator shall cause a duly certified copy of 
any will *** so admitted to record(when probated) to be recorded in any county or 
city wherein there is any real estate of which the testator died seized or which 
is devised by his will. On or after July 1, 1964, such will shall be indexed in 
the General Indices of Deeds in such clerk's office in the name of the testator as 
grantor." 
23. CORPORATE MEETINGS. A new section (V#lJ.l-41.1) reads, 11Unless otherwise provid-
ed by the articles of incorporation or by-laws of a corporation, any action required 
by this cha~er to be taken at a meeting of the directors, or any action which may 
be taken at a meeting of the directors or of a committee, may be taken without a 
meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so to be taken, shall be 
signed before such action by all of the directors, or all of the members of the 
committee, as the case may be. Such consent shall have the same force and effect 
as a unanimous vote.'' 
24. VIB-654.~ has been amended and now reads in part as follows: 
(b) A landowner shall owe no duty of care to keep land or premises safe for entry 
or use by others for hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, water sports, hiking, 
sightseeing, nor shall a landowner be required to give any warning of h~zardous 
conditions or uses of, structures on, or activities on such land or premises to any 
person entering on such land or premises for such purposes, except as provided in 
(d) hereof. 
(c) Any ]andowner who gives permission to another person to hunt, swim, trap, 
camp, hike, or sightsee upon land or premises does not thereby: 
(1) impliedly or expressly represent that the premises are safe for such 
purposes; or 
(2) constitute the person to whom such permission has been granted an invitee 
to whom a duty of care is owed; or 
(3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any intentional or negli-
gent acts of such person or any other person, except as provided in (d)hereof. 
(d) The provisions of this act shall not limit the liability which otherwise 
exists: 
for wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, 
use, structure or activity; or 
for injuries suffered in any case where permission to hunt, fish, trap, camp, 
hike, or sightsee, or for any other legal purpose, was granted for a consideration 
other than the consideration, if any, paid to such landowner by the State, the 
federal government or any other governmental agency. 
Legislative Changes. 18. 
25. INSURANCE. V#38.1-381 r .equirea that all public liability insurance policies in-
suring the owners of wate:rcratt bohtain the "omnibus clause" whereby anyone operating 
the craft with the consent· of the owner is also insured just as in the case of 
automobile liability insurance in Virginia at present. 
26. V#54~276.9(the Good Samaritan statute) now extends its immunity from civil suits 
to dentists(formerly only doctors of medicine) who in good faith render emergency 
care to any person injured as the result of a highway accident as a result of any 
act or omission in rendering such c~e. 
27. V/!38.1-262·.1 which is new permits the Corporation Commission to approve the 
written application of any insurer, or rating organization to file and use rating 
plans which produce premi~~s in excess of those provided by a filing otherwise 
applicable for use in writing motor vehicle insurance on classes of risks deemed 
by the Bbmmission to be substandard. 
28. TELEPHONE LANGUAGE. V#l8.1-238 has been amended as per underlined words. "If 
any person shall curse or abuse anyone, or use vulgar, profane, threatening or 
indecent language over any telephone in this State he shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor and may be prosecuted either in the county or city from which he called *** 
or in wmchtllecall is received." - -- -- ----
29. INSURANCE; SUBROGATION TO PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS: At common law there is no 
subrogation by an insurer to insured's personal injury claims agains~ tort-feasors 
unless expressly so agreed or provided for by statute. Newly enacted V#38.1-381.2 
outlaws such an agreement for subrogation to personal injury claims in contracts 
of bodily injury liability insurance that may be entered into after January 1,1965. 
30. V#18.1-74-lzl makes it a misdemeanor for any two or more persons to agree or 
associate or to mutually undertake to wilfully and maliciously injure another in 
his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever, or for the 
purpose of compelling another to do any act against his will. The next section 
allows the reco~ery of treble damages, but the Act expressly exempts employees who 
are using lawful means to protect t•.t.ir rights. 
Jl. Subsection(c) has been added to V#20-79. This subsection permits a court of 
record which has decreed with respect to a divorce, alimony, or support and custody 
of children to transfer the case to a juvenile court, or other appropriate court, 
for the subsequent enforcement or modification of the decree with reference to 
alimony, and support and custody of children. 
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. EFFECTIVE ON JA:NUARY 1, 
1966 ONLY AS TO TRANSACTIONS EN1'E!lED INTO ON AND AFTER THAT DATE. 
The following summary is a reprint of APPENDIX !(entitled Summary Analyses of 
Uniform Commercial Code) of the REPORT OF TI{E VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
(1963). 
ARTICLE 1 
GENEW\L PROVISIONS 
Article 1 contains general provisions applicable to the entire Code. #1-101 pro-
vides that it is -to be cited as the Uniform Commercial Code. It is to be liberally 
construed and applied so as to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which 
are set forth in #1-102(2) as follows: 
11 (2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commericial 
transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of cornmerical practices through 
custom, usage and agreement of the parties; 
., 
The Code gives the parties ~o commercial transactions large freedom of contract, 
:_providing that the effect of i'ts pro'IJ'isions may bo varied by agreement between the 
· ·parties, except as otherwise provided in the Code, and excep·t that obligations of 
good faith, diligence, ~easonableness, and care may not be disclaimed by agreement, 
although the parties rna~ ty agreement determine the standards, not manifestly un-
reasonable, by which these obligations,are to be measured. 
The Code is intended to be an exclusive codification of commercial law, providing 
within its framework the principles and analogies by which problems not precisely 
covered by its provisions may be resolved. To the extent, though, that particular 
provisions of the Code do not displace principles of law and equity, those principles 
continue to supplement the Code. 
#1-105 establishes the territorial application of the Code, but with nationwide 
adoption this becomes of small significance. The section provides that when a 
transaction bears a reasonable relation to a state adopting the Code and to another 
jurisdiction, the parties may agree as to which jurisdiction's law shall govern 
their rights and duties. In the absence of such an agreement, the Code applies to 
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to the state adopting it. 
Forty-six general definitions applicable throughout the Code, are set forth in 
#1-201. The term "buyer' in ordinary course of business," as distinguished from 
buyer, is used to refer to a person who in good faith and without knowledge that a 
sa~ may be wrongful buys in ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, 
in the business of selling goods of that kind. "Creditor" ia defined so as to in-
clude an assignee for the benefit of creditors or a trustee in a deed of trust to 
secure creditors. ·~od faith" is defined as rthonesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned." Both notice and value are fully defined. "Security inter-
est" is defined as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures pay-
ment or performance of an obligation, .. and replaces the traditional names of security 
arrangements, such as chattel mortgage, deed of trust, and conditional sale. 
#1-203 imposes an obligation of good faith in the perform~nce and enforcement of 
every contract or duty within the Code~ 
Tho Code provides a statute of frauds for commercial transactions involving sub-
etantial sums of money and for secured transactions. Except in contracts for the 
sale ~f. goods and securities and in secured transaotior1s, all of which are covered 
by specific provisions, the Code requires a signed writing in order to maintain an 
action or establish a defense where the amount or value of the remedy exceeds 
$$,000. 
ARTICLE 2 
SALES 
PART I .. 
2 .. 
Since Virginia has never adopted the Uniform Sales Act its sales law is found 
prlmarily in some 200 decisions of th~ Supreme Court of Appeals. Approximately 70% 
of these cases were decided before 1930. Many of the decisions are concentrated in 
parti,mlar areas, e, g., products liability. Further, many of the cases involve 
relatively narr.c-w points of law. As a result, the nlaw" of these decisions is piece-
meal and the precedent value of many of the generalizations made by the court is 
dubious. Finally, even though five decisions in the 1920's may exist on a particular 
point it is extremely difficult to predict what the Supreme Court of Appeals would 
do if the same type of controversy arose in 1963. This difficulty is compounded if 
there are no decisions in point and the attorney is compelled to adYise his client 
. with the hope that the court will follow the generally" prevailing view under the 
Uniform Sales Act. The value, then, of a comprehensive, systematized sales article 
cannot be over-estimated. 
bftt 1. 
Part 1 delineates the scope of Article 2 and deals with definitions rather than 
substantive law. Since Article 2 covers transactions in goods, i.e., contracts for 
the sale of goods, the definition of goods is important . Thus, distinctions between 
the sale of goods and, say, investment securities or chases in action must be made 
in Virginia if th~ UCC is adopted where previously they were relatively unimportant. 
In the main, the new definitions amplify and vary empha:3is r ather than change e:dst-
ing Virginia law. In most cases they are undoubtedly consist ent with commercial 
pr actice and understanding. In one area, however, a change has been made. Under ex-
isting Virginia law, oral contracts for the sale of standing timber to be severed by 
either the buyer or the seller are within the statute of f~auds relating to interests 
in land if the severance is not to cccur within a reasonable time. Under #2-107(1), 
standing timber sold to be severed by the seller at any time i s classified as goods 
rather than an interest in land. However, the change is minimi zed since the tr~ns­
action is now within the scope of Article 2 and thus subject to the statute of 
frauds provision relating to the sale of goods. 
PART 2. 
In treating the form1format ion and readjustment of contracts for the sale of goods, Article 2 makes the greatest changes in Virginia law. 
(a) Form 
--
112 .. 201 provides, for the firs t time in Virgi nia, a s ·::.at ute of frauds for the sale 
of goode. Cons istent with modern trends and the basic phi losophy of the UCC,how-
ever, the statute sanctions a ~iberal use of parol eviden~e to supplement writings 
which, while inaccurate or incomplet e, indi cate that a contract for sale has been 
made. The parol evidence rule of #2-202 permits the introducti on of a wide range of 
extrinsic evidence to explain or suppl ement wri~ten agreements unless the parties 
intended the writing to be a f i nal and complete expr ession of the deal. This 
liberalizes the appro~ch taken by many Virginia cases. 
#2-203 changes Virgini a law by abolishing the effect of the seal where transactions 
in goods are involved. 
ill Formation 
The UCC appears to be consistent wit h Virginia l aw except i n the following 
respects: (1) A f i rm offer must have consideration to be enforceable in Virgini a; 
(2) Virginia is more res trictive in the manner and medium available for the accept-
3. 
ance of offers and probably would deny the existence of a contract where the offer 
objectively requested performance as an acceptance and the offeree g2ve a promise 
to perform; (3) Virginia decisions reject the bade philosophy of #2-'2Q7 and make no 
differentiation between sellers and buyers who are »merchants't and those who are not. , 
It should be noted, however, that Virginia and the UCC both espo~se a liberal 
attitude toward the resolution of indefiniteness in agreements by resort to external~ 
objective standards, i.e. what would be reasonable in the business context, and the 
us~ of prior dealings and trade usage to achieve a practical construction of 
ambiguous terms~ 
(~) Rqadjustment 
#2 .. 209 conflicts with Virginia law ih two respects. First, the Code abolishes 
the need for consideration in modifying agreements. Second, the UCC modifies 
Virginia law by stating that a signed agreement which excludes modification or 
rescisdon except by a signed writing cannot be othen'ise modified or rescinded. 
Virginia permits an oral rescission of the written stipulation. 
#·2-210 appears to be consistent with existing Virginia law where the transfer of 
contracts is involved, although the UCC amplifies and mo're clearly defines the 
standards t• be applied. 1 
Part 3. 
Part 3 concerns the general obligation and const1~ction of contracts. In 6 of the 
11 Sections from #2-301 through #2-311 there are no Virginia deci3ion5 or statutes 
on point. Of these, #2-302, dea]ing with unconscionable contracts or clauses, and 
!12-305, dealing with open price terms, probably make the greatest changes in the 
traditional approach to contTacts while the other four are generally consistent 
with the Uniform Sales Acto The Virginia decisions are generally consistent with 
the remaining five sections. 
(~) Warranties 
The UCC warranty Sections are #2-312 through #·2··318. Virginia decisions have 
recognized and granted relief for breaches of express warranti~s and implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitnes s for a part.it'lular purposeo These decisions 
are consistent with UCC #ff~-313 through 2-315, although the Code is more detailed 
and comprehensive in its treatment ~f ~e problem. Since Virginia has never had an 
implied warranty of title case, #2-311 provides new rules for this problem. Virginia 
cases are generally in accord with the UCC on the proble~s of contractual exclusion 
or modification of statutory warranties !l 1f2 .. Jl6, and the -cumulation and conflict of 
several warranties express or implied contained in the same contract, #2-317. How-
ever, the UCC is more precise in both of these areas and contain express safeguards 
to insure that a limitation or exclusi9n of implied war "Danties be in writing, con-
spicuous and contain specific langua~~ of disclaimer. In summa:ry, the UCC works a 
general improvement in the statutor y treat ment of express and implied warranties 
yet is consist ent with the basic wc:u-rant.y policy reflected in Virginia cases. 
#2-318 effects a limited abolition of the privity defense in breach of warranty 
actions by specified users of goods agains t remote manufacturers or sellers. 
Virginia, however, has recently ena.cted legislat,ion whj_ch virtually abolishes the 
defense of privity. The Virginia s tatut e reflects the increasing tendency of 
modern decisions and we recomme::nd its substituti on for this section.(Note: This 
recommendation has been followed) 
(b)Delivery Terms 
- -
##2-319 through 2-325 prescribe and define certain terms commonly used in domestic 
and international sales transactions. #2·319 states t hat "F.O.B." is a delivery 
term and seems to change some Virginia decisions which suggested that 11 F.O.B. 11 
b 
is a price term when used in connection with the priC:e of goods. Virginia has no 
decisions or statutes which are affected by ##2-320 through 2-325. These sections 
contain prov-isions relating to and consistent with general practice in international_ 
sales transactions. 
(~) Speci.al Sales Situations 
ff#2-326 through 2-328 cover sales by consigrunent, approval, sale or return ~nd 
auction. '!'he UCC carefully defines the incidents and legal effects of these trans-
actions, giving special emphasis to the rights of the buyer's creditors to goods 
of the seller in the buyer's possession. Virginia has no case law in this area 
except. those decisions which seem consistent with the UCC' s position on when a 
buyer on approval has accepted gpods in his possession. The effect of the UCC on 
the Virginia Trader's Act, Code, #55-152, is discussed in the Virginia annotations 
to #2-326. Except for one anomaly upon which there is no Virginia rule, the sale 
by auction provisions of the UCC are consistent with Virginia law. 
Part 4. 
This part contains three important Sections on title, creditors and good faith 
purchasers. #2-401 is generally consistent with Virginia decisions and the Uniform 
Sales Act as to when title to goods passes from seller to buyer. As under previous 
law, the parties are free to agree when title passes but if the contract is silent 
a series of statutory rules govern the . issue. These, in turn, depend upon whether 
the contract authorizes the S:3ller to ship the goods or whether the goods are to be 
delivered without being moved. Unlike previous Virginia and Uniform Sales Act law, 
however, the importance of title under the UCC is minimized. Passage of title is 
immaterial to such questions as risk of loss, the buyer's right to seek specific 
performance and the seller's abil:.i..ty to sue the buyer for the price of goods. Title 
will still be important in the determination of problems outside the scope of the 
Code, such as public regulation and creditors rights. 
The rights of the sellerts unsecured creditors and the buyer to goods still in 
the seller's possession are set for·0h in l/2-402. If the buyer has obtained a 
special p:..~operty interest in the goods by identification( see f/2··501), the creditor 
who seeks to attach the goods is subject to the buyer's right to the specific goods 
as defined by //2-503(seller's insolvency) and ff2-716(opecific performa:1ce and 
replevin under specifie:d circumstance::J). There is little or no Vir~inia law on 
this problem~ If the buyer has no rights to specific goods by identification, the 
creditor may treat the sale or identific:ation and retention of p;'lssession by the 
seller as void under any appli~able rule of law in Vireinia unless the seller is a 
merchant wh.;} retained possession in good faith and in the cun·ec.t course of tro.de . 
for a commercially reasonable time. To the extent that the seller has not proper~y 
retained possession, the existing Virginia lew on fraudulent transfers would pre-
vail. But if the seller has properly retained posses2ion, a more difficult problem 
is presented. Wt·mld this prevail over Vir ginia Cod3 #/111-1, 55-95 and 55-96, which 
require the public recordation of bills of sale when possession is retained? We 
believe that it would, and to eliminate possible ambiguity, recommend that #1!11-1, 
55-95 and 55-96 be amend0d to exclude from their coverage retentions of possession 
by sellers which are otherwise proper under f/2-402" ( T!; / _r; /t -; ~ ) b r-..:: en r!IJ}) <:::.) 
#2-403 both clarif ieG and expands the rights of good faith purchasers for value 
of goods in which third persons other than the seller ha·ve legitimate interests. 
The clarification occur s in the statement of the general rule that a seller with 
voidable title may pass good title to a third person and a listing of four con ... 
troversial situations which the Code classifies as voidable rather than void trans~ 
actions • . The expansion centes in the power of a merchant to transfer good title in 
goods entrusted to him to a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though 
the merchant has no title whatever. This latter expansion clearly changes Virginia 
law. 
?arli 5 concerns performance of the contract of sale. #2-501 covers identification 
of goods to the contract, the effect of which is to create in the buyer both an in·-
e:u:rable and a special preperty interest in the goods. Under Virginia cases, identi-
fication is usually called appropriation and coupled with a conclusion that the 
parties jntended title to pass. Since the UCC separa~es the special property in-
terest created by identification from the passagl'l of title, this effects a change in 
theory under Virginia law. But whether the buyer obtains title to goods by 
appropriation in Virginia or a special property interest by identification under 
the UCC, the validity of his claim to specific goods in the seller's possession 
would seem to be substantially the same. Although title will give the buyer greater 
protection than a "special" property interest against the seller's unsecured 
creditors: the parties are free to agt·ee that title shall pass upon identification 
of goods to hlle contract of sale. 
The UCC carefully defines the manner of the seller's tender of delivery, #2-503, 
and his duties when the contract requires a shipment of goods to the buyer,#2-504. 
These seotions, though more detailed, are generally c'onsistent with the few Virginia 
cases on point. While the buyer's duty to pay for the goods is conditioned upon a 
tender of delivery by the seller, #2-507~ the seller is given a limited power to 
cure a defective tender under #2-)08o This l c:d;ter Section expands the "cure" 
rights provided by Virginia ca~e la,,r. On the other hand, while the buyer's tender 
of payment is a condition to the seller's duty to tender and complete any delivery, 
unless the cont~act otherwise provides the buyer may inspect the goods at the place 
of deli very before making a tende:!' of payment. ##2-511 and 2 .... 513. These rules 
appear to be consistent with Virginia law. Of course, the tender of payment is ex-
cused in a credit transaction and the right to inspect before payment does not 
exist if the contract, for exampl8, requires payment against documents of title. 
##2-514 and 2-515 provide new rules for the delivery of documents of title upon 
acceptance of a draft and the preserYing of evidence of goods in dispute. 
The risk of loss provisions of Part 5 repres ent another area of theoretical change 
made by the UCC. Under Virginia law and the Uniform Sales Act, risk of loss follow-
ed passage of title. While in many cases title did not pass until the goods had 
been delivered to hhe buyer it was not uncommon for title to pass either by express 
agreemP-nt or "appropriation" while the goods were still in the seller's possession. 
Thus, risk of loss would be on the buyer even though the seller was in possession. 
#2-509 divorces risk of loss from passage of title. In essence, risk of loss 
follo·..rs the transfer of possession by the seller to the buyer or a carrier if the 
sale is F .0. B. Deli very of possession m:q often coincide with the passage of title, 
thus preserving similar results if not reasoning. However, in cases where title has 
passed before delivery of possession, the ris!{ of loss remai.ns with the seller un-
less he is a non-merchant who is not obligated to ship the goods by carrier and 
tenders delivery to the buyer. #2-509(t) (.3). Different rules apply when the goods 
sold are in the possession of a bailee and these are gener ally consia(:;ent with 
v-irginia law. 
A basic reason for t hio chanae is the judgment that a merchant seller will or 
should have insurance to cover the risk of loss to goods in his possession. As long 
as he retains possession it is commercially fee.sible to pl ace the risk on tdm. In 
f act, the risk of loss r emains -vrith the sel1er who shipo F.O.B. destination until 
the carrier tenders delbrery of conforming goods to the buyer , or where the buyer 
accepts non-conforming goods and l a ter properly revokes his acceptance . However, 
if the seller identifies conforming 6oods to the contract and the buyer then 
treache:z his contract befor.:J the risk passes to him the seller may treat the risk 
of loss as resting on the buyer to the extent of any deficiency in insurance cover-
age. #2-510. This is a new concept which has no cou:rterpart in existing Virginia 
sales law. 
6" 
Part 6~ 
Part 6 deals with the general problems of breach, repudiation and excuse. Upon 
tBnder of goods by the seller, the buyer, under traditional sales law, has a right to 
inspect the goods. If they fail to conform in any respect #2-601 gives the buyer an 
option to accept or reject the whole or accept any commerci~l unit or units arn re-
ject the rest. A decision to reject all or part is closely regulatEld by 1/#2-602 
through 2-605 and their basic requirements of particularized notice to the sellsr. 
While the remedy of rejection is recognized in Virginia, . the UCC Sections defining 
procedures are pew. It is not clear whether Virginia would permit rejection for any 
failure to conform and there appears to be some limitation upon the buyer's ability 
to accept part of the non-conforming goods without waiving objections to the rest. 
If a buyer knowingly accepts non-conforming goods under the UCC, his rejection 
remedy is ended. Under both #2-607 and the law of Virginia, however, acceptance does 
not necessarily preclude other remedies for breach of liarranty, provided prompt 
notice is givan the seller. The UCC imposes stricter not1cr:: requirements on the 
buyer than are seemingly required by Virginia decisions. It appears that under both 
the UCC mand Virginia law a buyer who accepts without discovery of defects after a 
reasonable inspection may later 11revoken his acceptance and reject the goods. #'2-608. 
The UCC provides additional grounds for revocation of acceptance, specif · , es the 
time in which the revocation must occur and r equires p:romp-c notice to the seller. 
A buyer's power to reject tendered deliveries or res~ind in an installment contract 
is limited to cases where the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of the 
installment or the entire contract. #2-612. This is consistent with ~he theory of 
material breach in gcmeral contraet law. If the buyer may rr~scind the entire con-
tract, hol-TeVcr, there is a risk that he will reinstate it by certain conduct ~peci­
fied in 1,12-612(3). This 11waiver 11 i dea is generally consistent with Virginia law, 
although a few of the cases raise interesting factual variations. 
#2-609 gives either the seller or the buyer a right to demand adequate assurance 
of performance when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with regard to perfor-
mance of the obher. There is no comparable ViTginia rule. The UCC also has pro-
visions on anticipatory repudiation and the retraction of repudiations which are 
consistent with existing Virginia case l m.;. //#2-613 through 2w,616 have no counter-
part in existing Virginia law . #2-615, by defining situations where a performance 
failure is excused by the failure of conditio ns, apparently liberalizes the excuses 
for non-performance under Virginia lawo 
Part 7. 
--
This part carefully orga ni zes and details the various remedies possessed by sellers 
and buyers of goods upon breach of contract. For the most part, these baslc 
remedies are r ecognized in Virginia sales law. The UCC, howe-.rer, makes changes in 
the following important ~espects : (1) under the Code, a seller delivering goods on 
credit to an insolvent buyer may recla.im the goods within 10 days of their receipt, 
#2-702{2); (2) a seller tunder the UCC may recover the price of goods sold only 
when the buyer has accepted them and in t vro other specified circumstances, 1/2-709, 
while in Virginia an act:i on f or the price depends upon the passage of title; (3). the 
UCC, in a limited context, permit s the buyer to replevin goods in the seller's 
p®sseseion although Virginia has al)olished replevin as a form of action; (4) the 
UCC, in providing a fout"·Myear statute of limitations subject to a reduction to one 
year by agreement, b'2-725, redu~ed the Vi rginia l i mitati on from 10 years and in-
troduces some confusion as to whether, under Virginia la1..r, an agreement to reduce 
the statute of limitations ia eruorceable. 
ARTICLE 3 
COMMERCIAL PAPER 
I 
General Matters 
It nust be said at the start that Article 3 will not apply to some common and 
commercially important instruments covered by the present statute. #3··103 says 
ex_I:;licitly that the Article does not apply to investment securities. These are de-
fined in Article 8, #8-101, to include any instrument issued in bearer form, of a 
type commonly dBalt in on securities markets or commo~~Y recognized as a medium for 
investment, which is one of a class or series, and evidence:s an obligation of the 
issuer. So under the Code most corporate bonds and many mortgage bonds would be 
controlled by Article 8 and not by the rules relating to negotiable paper. The 
purpose is to free such instruments from the arbitrary rules as to form specified 
for negotiable paper and the result is to make applicable to them the same rules 
as are applicable to stock certificates. 
On the other hand Article 3 is made applicabJ.e by #3-805 to the anomalous instru-
ments which meet all tests of negotiability except that· they are not payable to 
order or bearer. All the rules applicable to negotiable paper will apply to these 
instruments except that no holder can occupy the position of a holder in due course. 
Anyone signing such an instrument assume;:; all t.he liabilities of maker, drawer, 
acceptor or indorser as the ca8e may be, and not common law obligations. And the 
rules applicable to transfer of such lnstruments will be the rules of nego-tiation 
rather than those of common law assignment. 
II 
With respect to the form an instrument must take to be negotiable, Article 3 
liberalizes the present law in some respects and settles some open questions. For 
instance, it allows provisi ons for acceleration on any grouHd, including the hold-
erts inse~urity, and specifically recogniz es the validity of certain extension pro-
visions(#J-109); it clarifies the negotiable status of instruments antedated or 
postdated (#3-114); it makes clear the effect. of out.sid9 agre8ments(3-119); it 
allows an exclusion of individual liability in the case of partnerships, uninr-orpor-
ated associations, trusts or estates, provided the entire assets are available for 
payment(#J-105). But in one important respect Article 3 is more restrictive than 
present law. Virginia Code, #'6-357, prohibits the inclusion in a negotiable instru-
ment of promises to do an act in additio n to the payment of money, with stated ex-
ceptions; but allows an opti on in the holder to take something in lieu of money. 
Article 3 eliminates the possibility of such option and prohibits(#3-104)not only 
np:comises" for ac t s in addition to the payment of money but 11obligations and powers" 
given by maker or drawer. The list of ex':eptj_ons stated in /!3-112 is reasonably 
broad, particularly the aJlowance of a promise to mai ntain or protect collateral. 
However, doubt is cast on the possibility of inserting in negotiable paper rights to 
inspect the maker's books, obligat ions by maker to refrain from certain business 
practices, and so on. 
III 
Holdar in Due Course 
A. Definition 
Under Article 3 as under existing law t he fundamental requirement for holder in 
due course status is good fai.th purchase for value, so at a glance the definition 
seems not materially alt ered . Yet t here are substantial changes. For example, 
nvalue11 is no longer defined as any consideration sufficient to support a simple 
contract; under #3-303 one tru{es an instrument for value to the extent ~ ~ 
e .. 
~g~-~ ~onsideration ha~ been p~for~. This is more a change of language than 
changa in result,, for NIL?~ and Virginia Code, /16-406, now limit oners holder in 
dL~e course status to the extent value has been paid before notice of some defect or 
:tnnrmi ty~ 
Other changes, however, will produce a difference in legal result. A purchaser 
will no longer be denied holder in due course status merely by purchasing after 
maturity, unless he has notice of the fact. This will clear up some troublesome 
questions in the case of paper whose maturity has been accelerated, or on which do·· 
mand has been m<".de. Similarly, an honest purchaser will not be condemned because 
he buys an instrument incomplete or irregular on its face, provided it is not so 
obviously so as to call in question its validity or terms. 
In these two respects the definition is altered in "'1ays making it easier for a 
holde:c to become a holder in due course. Yet in another and extremely crucial 
respect Article 3 may have altered present law to the disadvantage of the honest 
purchaser. Nothing is clearer under the present law than the rule that a holder is 
not denied ~older in due course rights because of mere negligence in his purchase. 
He falls from grace only if he acts in bad faith, buys when he is suspicious. 
Article 3, #3-302 defines a holder in due course as one who has bought "without 
notice ••• of any defense aga:i.nst or claim to ••• 11 . the instrument. Under #) .. 304 
he has such notice if he has no~ice that the ooJ.i6ation of any party is voidable in 
whole or part. And under Arti..::le l, #1-201(25), hEJ has notice of such fact when 
"from all the facts and cire:umotances known to him at the tima in question (the time 
of purchase) he has reason to know that it exists." It see1ns clear that the test 
under the Code is not whether one buys with suspicion, but -w'ith reason to know--
that is, negligently. This is a most unfortunate, and perh~p3 unint0ntional, return 
to the position held by the English courts for a very brief time and now repudiated 
by them and by the Negotiable Instruments Law. N'ilw York has nmended the UCC to 
(~_t),l;rn to r.th? .~~-nc~p_t of ~!le, NILJ ~m~ ,we l~·S)omm;no a similar amendment. 1 ?, 0 l!fl.<-rft M ~ ". ·,:&. rt;." /),4.,~ _,(,..>t.Y.- 1 l ... -6_ .d--:,.~ ·~~ J 
113-302 incorporates into the statute itself the preferred caoe law rule that the 
payee may be a holder in due course if he meets the usual tests. P3~201 continues 
the rule that a person who may not himself qualify as a holder in due course may en-
joy the status vicariously by purchase from one. Present law denies this right 
only to a person who has been par·~y to some fraud or illegality affecting the instru-
ment. /13-201 denies the priYilege also to a person who, while holding the instru-
ment, knew of some defense or claim against it and sells and later reacquires it. 
B. Proof 
As under present law one suing on ne~vtiable paper will have an initial burden of 
showing he owns the instrument. This often involves the proof of signatures, a 
point as to which plaintiff will have the burden of proof. But he will no longer 
(as under Virginia Code fl8~lll.J.)have to allege thoir genui::.E:Ii9SS in his pleading. 
Under Art.icle 3, #3-307, they are admitt ed unless denied in defendant's pleading. 
And even though so challenged, signatures will be presumed genuine. 
Under present law, once plaintiff has by proof of signatures or otherwise proved 
himself a holder he is by statute declared to be presumptively a holder in due 
course, which presumption the defendant can rebut only by showing those particular 
defenses defined by the statutes as "defec t.s of tltle.n Plaintiff does not have to 
sustain the burden of proof on t.he i ssue of his being a holder in due course until 
such technical defense is shown; r ather defendant is undar the burden of proof. 
Article 3 makes a significant cbange here. There is no stated presumption that 
plaintiff holder is a holder in due course. But plaintiff is required to prove him-
self such' whenever any defense is proved by defendant~ In other words, the unstated 
presumption is defeated by proof of any defense, not as at p:tesent by some technical 
defenses only. Hence under the Code the plaintiff will have the burden of proving 
himself a holder in due course much more frequently than he now does . 
Q· Rj~hts ~ Defenses 
These are in general th-e same as under existing law. But in #3-305 it in flatly 
stated that a holder in due course takes the in::;trument f:ree from 11all claims to it 
on the part of a ny person.'' This would include claim made by an infant~ and 
Changes Virginia law. 
As under existing law even a holder in due course will be subject to defenses of 
j_nfan~y, incapacity or illegality resulting in voidness.; fraud in the factum and 
discharge(#J-305); will be able to enforce ccmpletGd instruments as filled up re-
gardless of breach of authority, and altered instruments according to their original 
tenor (//3·-L.O'l). But it will no longer be a defense a~ainst a holder in due course 
that the instrument was incomplete and not delivered.(Note:Under UCC 3-305 and 3-60~ 
a holder in due course takes subject to discharge only if he has notlce thereof,or, 
it arises independently of the UCC such IV as a discharge in bankruptcy) 
NEGOTIATION 
As under present law, negotiation under the Code will be effected by delivery 
alone in some cases or by indorsement plus delivery in O'thers. And the result of 
negotiation will be to constitute the transferee a holder (#3-202). To be effective 
an indorsement must be on the inst1·e.ment or on a paper so firmly attached as to be-
come a part of it. This probably changes Virginia lawn 
But contrary to the present :;_•ule, paper made to beai·er on 1 -cs face will not re-
main such and therefore always negotiable--by delivery alone. Under Article 3 when-
ever any negotiable instrument receives & special indorsement it can be fuL-ther 
negotic>.ted only by th9 signature of the special indorsee(f/3··204). 
Furthermore, under Article 3 a l'Mtrictive indorsem0nt no longer destroys the 
negotiability of the instrument. It remains negotia.ble and a future taker may be-
come a holder in due course of it if he pays value conds-tently with the indorse-
ment. If the restrictive indorsement is of the type \>Thich 0re.::.tes a trust rather 
than an agency even this requirem8nt of paymerit of value consistently with the 
indorsement applies only to the first taker under the indorsement, i.e., the 
trustea. Purchasers from the ·i:,rustee and later holder s are in no way affected by a 
rest.ric tive indorsement of lbhis type. 
In the case of restrictive indoraements of the agency type, calling for collection 
or deposit, the situation is normally one where the instrum0nt is put into bank 
collection channels. If that happsns, the provision!3 of Ar'l".i~le 4 on Ban..!.(: Collect-
ions come into operation and by E::Xplir:i t prov-is).on control the provisions of 
Article 3. 
v. 
LIABILITY OJi' PAHTIES 
A. In General 
Article 3, #3-80?., is a new prOVlS10n which makes it clear (2) that while a 
negotiable instrumGnt is outs tanding but not due parties to it are not liable on 
any underlying obligation for whieh it was given,(b) that when the instrument is 
due the holder may sue on it or on the underlying obligation, and (c) that discharge 
of a party on an ins trument dis:::harges hi m also on the underlying obligation. 
Article 3, /1803, gives a par·~y s ued on an instrument a ri ght to notify any party 
liable to him on the instrument, and if the noti ce states that that party may come 
in and defend and he does not do so he is bound by factual determinations. 
10 .. 
The Code makes a change in the law as to liability of parties who sign incomplet3 
instruments o They are now liable to holders in due course on the instrument a.s COfi1 .. 
pleted, but not. liable to a non-holder in due course. Under #3-407, they r,.Jill be 
liable to non-holders in due course according to the authority to complete original~y 
given unless the filling in is done with fraudulent, purpose. 
-This same section also effects a substantial change in the law applicable where the 
instrument is altered by means other than unauthorized completion. Under it the 
only alteration that may a·void an instrument is one made by the holder, and not as 
no1.-r by a holder or a stranger. Again, unless the alteration isnade with fraudulent 
purpose, even a non-holder in due course may recover, according to the original 
tenor of the instrument; whereas under present law he recovers nothing. 
As pointed out above, against a holder in due course a defendant may no longer 
successfuly defend on the ground the instrument was both incomplete and not delivered 
Nor may one any longer defend on the ground that a necessnry signature has been 
forged, in cases where an imposter has used the mails to effect his scheme rather 
than dealing face to face. #3~·405 treats the two cases alike. It does not treat 
such instruments as bearer paper, but provides that an indorsement by any person in 
name of the named payee is effective. This appr oach is also taken In the Section 
as to paper dishonesty made or drawn to a payee lvho is ficti ti.ous, or not intended to 
have any interest in the instrument, whereas present law treats these as cases of 
bearer paper needing no indorsement. 
Under #3-306, a defendant may not defend on the ground that some party other than 
the plaintiff has a claim to t he instrument unless su.ch third party claim is based 
on a situation of theft or rights under a restrictive indorsement. This settles 
a point where the Virgj_nia law ha3 b1~en undecided and there has been conflict in 
other jurisdictions. On the other hand, contrary to present law, a party notified 
of a third party cla:im may nevertheless safely pay the pre.senting holder, unless the 
third party claim is based on theft or rights under a res t :..nicti ve indorsement 
(#3-603) 0 
_?.· Liabilit~ of ~en.!: 2::. Repres entative 
In accord with present law a person signing as agent or in some representative 
capacity is personally liable unless authorized in fact to sign; and is furthermore 
liable t.o anyone other than the party immediately dealt with unless the instrument 
both names the person represented and shows the signature was in a representative 
capacity. However, when sued by his immediate party tha agen·0 may defend against 
personal liability if the im::trument E:hows either of these facts, being allowed to 
prove the other · by parol (#3-403). As to this l2.st point the Secti.on settles a 
matter as to vlhic:h Virginia law had not been clear . 
c. Indorsers and ~aw~ 
Article 3 makes no change in the bas te rule t hat, absent wai ver, the promise to 
pay of indorser and drawer is conditioned on proper presentment, notice of dishonor, 
t.t.nd in s ome cas es protes t . !Io"ivever , contr ry to present l mv, one who indor ses after 
maturity is not en t.i tled to these steps ( !13-501 (4) • Furthermore, whereas the present 
statute states that the drawer of a check is di scharged only to the extent of his 
loss if notice is not given, #3- SO?. (l)(b) provides that if either proper presentment 
is not made or notice giv en and tho bank becomes insolvent, such drawer may dis-
charge his l i ability by as s igning to t he holder hi s rights agai nst the bank, but is 
not otherwise di schar ged. 
Protest is no longer required of ins truments drawn in one s t at e and payable in 
another, but only· of instruments drawn or payable outs ide the United States and its 
territories(#3-501). 
11. 
:::--'resentment for payment of a check, to hold an indorser, must be within seven dnyJ 
after his indorsement, rather than within, roughly, the one day a.ccorded under 
present law. With respect to ~he liability of the dra.wer presentment must be ~ri th-
in thirty days of date or issue (113-503). Presentment by mail or through a clearing 
house is expressly sanctioned. And if presentment is at a proper place and neither 
the party to accept or pay nor his agent is present, presentment is excused(#3-50h). 
This r epresents a considerable relaxation in favor of the holder, who will now not 
have to prove grounds of excuse otherwise. 
Notice of dishonor is no longer required within one day. Three days are allowed 
for this purpose(#'3-508). And whereas at present effective no:i;ice can be given 
only by the holder of a dishonored instrument or some one who has received notice 
fr~m him or through him, this same section provides that r.otice may be given by 
the holder, a party who has received notice, or any other party who can be compelled 
to pay the instrument--a considerable liberalization. 
Under #3-510 not only a certificate of protest but a bank stamp or ledger entry 
indicati:ng dishonor are admissible as evidence and create a presumption of dishonor 
and proper notice. 
The liability of indorsers on wru~ranty are rephrased but apparently not changed. 
p. Banks and 9ther Drawees 
-----
The rule of Price v. Neal is codified in 1/#3-~.17(1) and J ... hl8; but the method of 
handling the problems is-new. The approach taken is, under #3 ·-418, that pcyment or 
acceptance by drawee is final, unless it has a right of recoYery (#3··417 (a)). This 
latter Section provides that anyone who obtains payment or acceptance (and any prior 
transferor) warrants to the person accepting or paying (a)title; (b) lack of know-
ledge of forgery of the drawer's signature in some circumstances, and (c) absence 
of material alteration in some cases. The rules are stated in complicated fashion, 
but the results under them should be in accord with ~cisting law. For instance a 
bank paying on a forged indorsement is liable to the true owner under the provision 
of 113·419 that it is by this action a converter; but it can recover from the person 
paid, even a holder in due cou~se, because of the breach of the warranty of title. 
Where a bank is involved reference should also be made, of course, to Article 4, 
in particular to #4~207. 
E. ~charge 
The changes here are minor. There is n change in method of approach; the present 
law focusing on discharge of the instr ument and the consequent results thereof, 
,-.hereas the Code focuses on dischru·ge of the parties. But the results w'ill be 
about the same under the Code as under present law. 
ARTICLE 4 
BANK DE.POSI TS AND COLT ECTIONS 
Ar ticle 4 codifies and develops present l aw r el at i ng t o bank deposit s and collect-
ions as f ound in t:1e following: Negotiabl e Instruntents La.,.r, adopted in all the 
states; 'the American Bar..kers Assoc;_ation's Bank Collecti..on Code, adopted in 
eighteen states but not in V:i r ginia.; def erred posting statutes , adopted in most 
states; and miscellaneous statutes r el ating t o stop pa.:yment orders, limitations on 
liability for payment of forged and altered checksj and similar matters. The case 
l aw developing rules of contract, agency, and trusts as applied to bank deposits 
and collections is codified in the Article. 
~ 12. 
TtJ'hile t,he entire Code seeks to retain flexibility in the development of commerica~ 
law, this is particularly true of Article 4. The specific provision of #4-103(1) 
expressly embodies this concept of flexibility. It authorizes, subject to concepts 
of good faith and ordinary care, variation by agreement of the provisions of the 
Article. 
Some knowledge of banking practices is necessary to a full understanding of this 
Article, which is relatively complex. The rules laid down are sufficiently broad to 
take account of different operating procedures as between diffe rent banks, as well 
as the different procedures a particular bank applies to different types of items, 
while retaining the opportunity .for future changes in internal operating procedures. 
Part 1: General Provisions and Definitions 
Under #4-102 the law of the place where the bank is located governs its liability 
for action or nonaction as to any item handled by it f or purposes of presentment, 
payment, or collection. A branch or separate office of a bank, under #4-106, is 
considered a separate bank for most purposes. 
#4-107 authorizes a bank to fix two P.M. or later as a cut-off hour for the hand-
ling of money, and items and the mru<ing of entries in its books. The time limits set 
forth in the Code may be extended, unless ot.her-vrise instructed, by a collecting bank 
in a good faith effort to secure payment, .for a period of not in excess of an 
additional banking day. Delay may also be excused if caused by circumstances beyond 
the control of the bank. 
Part 2: Collection of Items: Depository and Collecting Banks 
'l'he considerably litigated question of whether a bank takes an item as purchaser or 
as agent for collection is settled under the Code in #h-201 in favor of the view that 
the bank always takes nfor collection,n unless a contrary intent clearly appears. 
The Virginia cases have considered the forin of the indorsement, and the entry made 
on a deposit slip by the original owner of a draft, to be of large significance in 
determining whether a bank was a purchaser of the draft or onJy an agent for collect-
ion. Under the Code the form of the indorsement is imnaterial on this question. 
How·ever, Virginia is consistent with the Code approach in that no particular signifi-
cance is placed on the form of indorsement placed on the draft by the depository 
bank itself, or to a right of recourse by the depository bank aga.inst the drawer of 
the draft. 
#4-204 authorizes direct forwarding to a payor bank for collection; #4-202 requires 
the collecting bank to use due diligenee in other respects in the collection of the 
item. Under #4.:.205 a deposttory bank may supply a missing indorsement, and #4-206 
authorizes transfer3 between banks by any agreed method that identifies the 
transferor bank. 
The problem of payment and acceptance of .forged and altered items is dealt. with 
in #4-207, as in Article 3, in terms of warranties · · made by the customer of the 
bank and by the collecting bank on transfer and presentment of items . 
114-208 gives a collecting bank a security interest in i terns' the accompanying docu-
ments, and the proceeds . It recognizes that a bank has a security interest in an 
item or its proceeds to the extent that bank credit given on the basis of the item 
has been withdrawn. This section o.f the Code recognizes that a bank may have a 
security interest in an item, and so have given value, if the credit is available for 
withdrawal as of right, whether or not drawn upon. 
The Code sets forth in detail the media of remittance that may be used in bank 
collections, expressly recognizes rights of charge-back, and undertakes to define 
when an item is finally paid. 
~ ... 
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1/4-·?.14 set forth preference rules to be applied in case a bank in the course of 
collection becomes insolvent. 
Part 3: Collection of Items: Payor Banks 
The deferred posting provisions of the Code, set forth in #4-301, carry out the 
sa.me basic purposes as the Virginia statutes on the subject. While the Code uses 
different terminology, there are no apparent significant differences. 
#4-303 contains provisions setting forth when items are subject to stop payment 
orders, legal process, or setoff, and also provides the order in which items are to 
be charged or certified. 
Part 4: Relationship Between Payor Bank and its Customer 
The Code in #4-401 allows a bank to charge a customer's account according to the 
original tenor of an altered item. 
The Code recognizes the right of a customer to stop payment on any item payable 
from his account, if the order is received by the bank at such time and in such 
manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act upon it. Oral orders 
are binding only for fourteen calendar days, unless confirmed in writing within that 
period. Written orders are effective only for six months, unless renewed in writing. 
#4-405 provides that until a bank has· knowled ge of the death or an adjudication of 
incompetency of a customer and a reasonable opportunity to act on it, the authority 
of the bank to accept, pay, or collect his items is not revoked. Even with know-
ledge of death, the bank for ten days after the date of death may pay or certify 
checks drawn on or prior to the date of death, although it, is not intended to prevent 
the personal representative from recovering the payment. A person claiming an 
interest in the account may, however, order the bank to stop payment. 
#4-406 of the Code recognizes that a depositor owes a bank the duty of examining 
statements of account and cancelled che~ks and to repor t unauthorized withdrawals 
from his account. It draws distinctions between the customer's duty as regards his 
own forged signature and altered items, and his duty as regards forged endorsements, 
where he cannot be expected to know the signatures of the i ndorsers. The Code is 
somewhat broader in its coverage, as regards items, signatures, and types of altera-
tions, than the Virginia statutes. The statutes of limitations in the Code are 
longer than those presently in effect in Virginia. 
#4-407 expressly recognizes that a p~yor bank has a right of subrogation when it 
has made an improper payment. 
Part 5. Collection of Documentary Draf ts. 
This subject has not general ly been cover ed by statute, and there is no relevant 
law in Virginia 
ARTIClE 5 
LETTERS OF CREDIT 
Article 5 undertakes a parti al codif i cat i on of the l aw r elating to l etters of 
credit. The letter of credit business has a s t r ong i nt e::-nati.onal flavor, and has 
generally been carried out in accordance with the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Commerc i al Documentar y Credits, adopt ed in 1951 by the 13th Congress of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce . So far as the United States is concerned, the letter 
of credi t business has been concentrated in New York ~ As a result, the only con-
sistent and, anywhere near, compr ehens i ve body of Ameri can l aw relat i ng to l etters 
of credit has been developed i n the deci sions of the New York courts and the Federal 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
J.4 , 
Virginia has no statute law and only one case - arJ.Slng out of a transaction th9.'._ 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia said in' -- tved a letter of credit. One of 
the greatest services Article 5 provides for Virginia is to establish guideposts on 
this matter of identity. 
Article S gives everyone ready access to some of the open secrets regarding l etter 3 
of credit, already available in publications of the International Chamber of Commerce 
the New York decisions, and other sources. 
ARTICLE 6 
To understand this Article, one must know the general purpose of bulk sales legis-
lation. Assume that a merchant has a stock of inventory which he holds for sale in 
the ordinary course of business. Assume further that a cr editor, relying on that 
stock of inventory arrl the income that it will generate, extends unsecured credit to 
the merchant. So long as the merchant sells inventory in the ordlnary course of 
business the unsecured creditor has a good chance of b·eing paid. But if the merchant 
sells all or substantially all of that inventory for value to a third person not in 
the ordinary course of business, the risk of nonpayment is materially increased. In 
one deal the creditor loses a large part of the merchant's assets upon which a levy 
might be made. Further, even if the conveyance amounts to a fraud on creditors,most 
states protect the third pari~y purchaser unless he had notice of his seller's fraudu-
lent intent. Thus, while a creditor might set aside a. proposed conveyance by the 
merchant which is in fraud of creditors, he oannot lev-y on the inventory once it has 
been delivered to a purchaser for value without notice. The creditor 1 s best security: 
therefore,is the proceeds of the sale which have been recGived by the merchant seller< 
Bnt if those proceeds are inadequate or have been dissipated before the ereditor is 
informed of the transaction, his rights are seriously impaired. 
The Virginia Bulk Sales Act, Virginia Cde #ffS5-8J to 86, and Article 6 of the UCC 
approach these problems in substantially the same way. Unde~ both statutes, speci-
fied bulk transfers of certain quantities of inventory or equipment not in the trans-
feror's uaual or ordinary course of business are ineffective against creditors unless 
three basic eondi tions are met: (1) the part.i.es prepare a schedule of the property 
involved which is held by the transferee for six months after the transfer and made 
available for inspection by the transf aror' s creditors ; (2) the transferor prepares 
at the transferee's demand a sworn list of creditors which, again, is held by the 
transferee for six months, subje-ct to inspection; (3) tije transferee gives notice of 
the proposed transfer to the transferor 1 s creditors at least 10 days before taking 
possession of the goods. Since the creoitor has notice before the transfer occurs, 
he may utilize available state remedies t o protect his interest.,i.e. prevent the 
transfer ·as a fraud on creditors, impound the proceeds when received by the trans-
feror or negotiate a consensual payment arrangement with the transferor. 
There are differences of a relatiYel y minor nature betvTeen the Virginia Bulk Sales 
Act and Article 6 of the UCC. For example, t.he Virginia statute applies to bulk 
transfers of "any part" of' 1speoified goods while Article 6 applies to bulk transfers 
of a "major part11 of the seller's inventory. Similarly, the Virginia Act is more 
readily applied to bulk transfers of fixtur es or equipment "pertaining11 to a stock 
inventory than is Article 6. 
On the other hand, Article 6 is more precise than the Virginia Bulk Sales Act in 
defining what property is subject to the act and in listing eight specific exceptions 
to the act's literal coverage. Further, Article 6 requires more information to be 
contained on the schedule of property, list of creditors and notice to creditors than 
does Virginia. Additional precision is obtained in Article 6 by prescribing which 
creditors can objeo ·~ to defective transfers, whi ch creditors are entitled to notice, 
the legal effect. of defects in the list of creditors prepared by the transferor and 
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the rights of third persons who, without notice, purchase inventory from the immadi·· 
ate transferee in a defective bulk sales transfer. These questions have been lef t t c 
the courts in Virginia. Article 6 also adopts a six month statute of limitations 
for all bulk transfers. Finally, Article 6 contains a special provision for bulk 
sales by auction which is not found in Virginia. 
In summary, the purpose of Article 6 is to simplify and make uniform the law of 
bulk sales. The differences between Article 6 and the Virginia Bulk Sales Act are 
insubstantial. 
Article 6 provides an optional "Application of Proceedsn section which may be 
adopted or rejected without serious damage to the principle of uniformity. This 
section imposes upon the transferee a duty to ttassure that such consideration (i.e., 
the sale price) is applied so far as necessary to pay those debts of the transferor 
which are either shown on the list furnished by the transferor .. e or filed in l-Jri ting 
in the place stated in the notice ••• within thirty days after the mailing of such 
notice.n 
Only five of the first sevent;een states to adopt the. Umform Commercial Code have 
enacted the Application of Proceeds section. These states are Alaska, Kentucky, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Oklahoma. In general, the reasons for rejection of the 
optional provisions refect a feeling that notice coupled with independent creditor 
remedies in particular states is adequate prote~tion for the unsecured creditor. 
We concur in this view and r.ec9mmend that the optional provisions be omitted. (7!) ~:-r 
L ,7.. Vf /1 c' e Yt {) Pt I 11 C: t/1) 
II '- .... ARTICLE 7 
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILI.S OF LADING, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS OF 'riTLE 
Article 7 is a consolidation and r8vision of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, 
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, and the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act relating 
to the negotiation of documents of title. The criminal provisions of the Warehouse 
Receipts Act and the Bills of Ladlng Act are omitted as being inappropriate to a 
Commerical Code. The Article does not under~ake to define the tort liability of 
bailee&, except to hold certain classes of bailees to a minimum standard of reason-
able care. ',, 
The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act was promulgated in 1906 and adopted by Virginia 
in 1908. Neither the Unifonn Bills of Lading Act nor the Uniform Sales Act has been 
adopted by Virginia. 
Article 7 makes as few innovations in existing law as any of the articles of the 
Code. 
Part 1: General 
This part contains general definitions and statements regarding the difference be-
tween a negotiable and nonnegotiable document of title, which are consistent with 
present law, to the extent that these subjects are now defined. 
Part 2: Warehouse Receipts: Special Provisions 
The formal requirements of the Uniform Warehouse Rec eipts Act are continued in 
#7-202. 
#7 -20/!j. defines the warehouseman 1 s duty of care and provides how his liability can 
be limited by contract. The warehouseman's l ien is spelled out j_n detail in #7-209, 
and the method of enforcement, i n #7-210. Under the UCC the warehouseman converts the 
goods only if he wilfully fails to comply with the requirements set forth. 
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Part 3: Bills of Lading: Special Provisions 
The provisions of this part provide new statutory law in Virginia consistent with 
t he Uniform and the Federal Bi lls of Lading Acts. 
1/7-309 provides that a carrier "must exercise the degree of care in relation to t he 
goods which a reasonably careful man would exercise under like circumstances. 11 This 
section expressly provides that the Code does not repeal any law or rule of law which 
imposes liability upon a common carrier for damages not caused by its negligen~e. 
As a result, Code 1950, #56-119, which invalidates contractual provisions purporting 
to exempt transportation companies from their liability as common carriers, is con-
tinued in effect. This section permits the carrier to limit the amount of damages 
on the basis of declared values. The section authorizes t.he carriers to make 
reasonable provisions as to the time and manner of presenting claims and instituting 
actions . 
Part 4: Warehouse Receipts and Bill of Lading: General Obligations 
This part continues and expan,dsche provisions of the earlier uniform acts. #7 -404 
is in accord with Virginia law. 
/ 
Omission of the optional language in 117 ··403 (1) (b) will l eave unchanged the Virginia 
rule as regards the bur~yn of proof in~~ing ;~ha l~ability of a warehouseman, and 
this is recommended. ( 1·--~:~ r/;/JV·" "~ . k.t ...  --. jf1'. ?t~ .. ,<-{) 
" ~.~ 
Part 5: Warehouse Feceipts and Bills of J.,ading: Negotiation and Transfer 
Under 11#14.0 and 47 of the Uniform Warehouse Recei pts Act, as now i n ef fect in 
Virginia, a warehouse receipt can only be negotiated by t he owner or by a person 
to whom the possession or custody of the receipt has been entrus ted by the owner,so 
that a person who obtained the receipt by trespass on· by finding could not negotiate 
the document. The UCC follows the 1922 amendments proposed by t he National Conf er-
ence of Commissioners on Uni form St a te Laws ·under whi ch a person within the tenor 
of the document and in possessi on, 11 however such pos session may have been acquired," 
could negotiate the document. Thi s changes Vi r gini a law. 
In other respects this part continues and develops the prior law of the uniform 
acts. 
Part 6, Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading: Miscellaneous Provisi ons 
117-603 excuses a bailee from delivery when conflicting claims are made upon hi m 
until he has had a reasonable time to ascertain the validity of the adverse claims 
or to bring an acti.on to compel the claimants to i nterpl ead. 
ARTICLE 8 
I NVESTMENT SECURITI ES 
This Article replaces the Uniform Negotiable Ins truments Law, adopted in Virginia 
in 1897, to the ext ent t hat act covered bonds used as i nvest ment securities. It re-
places the Uniform Stock Trans f er Act, promulgat ed in 1909, adopted in Virgini a in 
1924, and eventually by all the stat es . This Arti cle does not r epl ace, but by 
#10-104 is made subj ect, in case of inconsistency, t o t he Unif orm Act for the 
Simplificati on of Fiduciary Secur i ty Transf er s, pr omul gated i n 1958 and adopted 
in Vir ginia in 1960. 
This Article uses a functional rat her t han a f ormal defini t ion of a security. 
#8-102 defines a security as an ins trument j_n bear er or r egistered form which is of 
a type "commonly dealt in upon securlties e}:changes or market s or commonly recognized 
in any area in which it i s i ssued or dealt i n as a medium of investment.tt In 
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general, then, the Article covers bearer bonds, previously covered by he Negotiable 
I nstruments Law; certificates of stock, previously covered by the Stock Transfer Act; 
and registered bonds and additional types of investment paper, not covered by any 
statutes., 
The Article is not a Corporation Code nor a Blue Sky Law, statutes covering these 
subjects being unaffected. 
Part 1: General Matters 
This part provides definitions, establishes rules for governing the effect of an 
over-issue, declares that securities are negotiable, ~nd outlines the rights and 
duties of the parties in a sale of securities. #8-103 provides that a lien in favor 
of an issuer is valid against a purchaser only if the right of the issuer to such a 
lien is noted conspicuously on the security. 
Part 2: Issue--Issuer 
The term nissuer" is comprehensively defined in #8-201 for the purpose of this 
Article only. #8-202 set forth the issuer's responsibilities and defenses and the 
effect of notice of a defense or defect. In general, it extends the provisions of 
the Negotiable Instruments Law to all securities . The section gives validity to a 
security in the hands of a purchaser for value and without notice of a particular 
defect, even though the defe~t is so se~ious that it is said to go to the validity 
of the security. A security in the hands of a bona fide purchaser is voided only if 
so declared in a Constitution or statute, either expressly or by unavoidable 
i.rnplication. 
#8-203 deals with matured or called securities, and makes an extensive modification 
in the policy that a holder in due course must take before maturity of the instrument. 
The defense of lack of notice is limited to one and two years depending upon the 
circumstances. It permits the issuer to determine definitely its liability with 
reference to invalid or improper issue, and this point is fixed at two years maximum 
after the default. The section does not, however, extend beyond the redemption date, 
the life of prefer~d stock called for redemption. 
#8-204 provides thay unless noted conspicuously on the security, a restriction on 
transfer imposed by the issuer, even though otherwise lawful, is ineffective,except 
against a person with actual knowledge of it. The Code does not undertake to deal 
with restrictions on transfer i~posed by private agreement or restrictions on 
transfer imposed by other· statutes. 
Under #8-205 a forged security is made val i d in the hands of a purchaser for value 
without notice, if the signing was done by one entrusted by the issuer with the 
signing, or by an ernployee entrusted with responsible handling of the security. 
#8-206 continues prior law on the effect of completion or alteration of an instrument, 
#8-207 covers the rights of the issuer with respect to registered owners and #8-
208 states the warranties made by an authenticatj_ng trustee, registrar, or transfer 
agent in signing a security . 
Part 3: Purchase 
In general, this part extends the '.~doctrine of negotiability to all investment 
securities. #8-302 defines a bona f1..de purchaser as a purchaser for value in good 
faith and without notice of any adverse claim who t akes delivery of a security in 
bearer form or of one in registered form issued to him or indorsed to him or in 
blank. #8-304 defines when a purchaser has notice of an adverse claim. #8-305 sets 
time limits when s taleness, o~ the pur chase of a security after it has been called 
for redemption or payment, gives notice of adverse claims. #8-306 sets forth the 
13 .o 
warr<mties a person makes when he presents a security for registration of transfer, 
payment or exchange. 
##8-307 through 8-311 deal with indorsements: the effect of delivery without in-
dorsement~ the right to compel indorsement, lmw an indorsement is made, the effect 
0f an indorsement, and the effect of an unauthorized indorsement. 
#i/8··312 through 8-316 deal with various aspects of guarant,eeing signatures, de-
livery of securities, the reclamation of securities wrongfully transferred, and a 
purchaser's right to requisites for registration of transfer. 
#8-317 continues the basic provision of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act that an 
attachment or le·vy on a security can only be made by actually seizing or possessing 
the security so it can no longer be transferred. In Iron City Sa .. :ings Bank v. 
Isaacsen, 158 Va.609, 632, 164 S.Ea520(1932), the Stock Transfer Act was-Interpreted 
to mean that the holder of the stock must be before the court. This section of the 
Code provides that a creditor whose debto~ is the owner of a security is entitled to 
the aid of courts in reaching it to satisfy his claim. 
#8-319 establishes a statute of frauds for Jhhe sale of securities, and since 
Virginia has not had such a statute covering securities, this changes Virginia law. 
Part 4: Registration 
An issuer is required to rerister the transfer of a security in registered form 
when the requirements set forth in 118-401 have been met. #8-402 provides lhhat the 
issuer may require assurancen that each necessary endorsement is genuine and effect-
ive, including a guarantee of the signature of the person indorsing. 
The other sections of this part deal with the issuer's duty of inquiry when a 
security is presented for registration, the issuer's liability as a result of regis-
tration, circumstances under which an issuer must issue a new security when a 
security has been lost, destroyed, or wrongfully taken, and the duties of an 
authentica·ting trustee, transfer agent, or reglstrar. 
ARTICLE 9 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
I • GENERAl. COMMENTS 
Prior to detailed consideration of some prov1S1ons of Article 9 and their applica-
tion to conventional Virginia business transactions it may be well to respond to 
two general objections frequently 1nade to this Article . 
These two objections are: 
1. ttArticle 9 is completely novel." Implied in this objection is the further ob-
jection that lawyers wou.ld find Arti cle 9 11 foreign11 and would have to learn "security 
law" all over again; this, in turn, might lead to a fear that Virginia security law 
would suffer from uncertainty until a l engthy and extensive training period had 
expired. 
2. The unsecured seller selling goods to merchants will suffer under the Code be-
cause Article 9 permits a lender to obtain a val:td J.ien on a shifting stock of mer-
chandise and permits a floating lien for future advances and on after-acquired 
property. 
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After attempting a refutation of theRe two objections, a brief examination vJj_ll 
be made of some of the problem areas of Article 9, this folloued by a summary of 
some of the advantages of Article 9 over cttrrent Virginia law. 
A. General 
Peter Coogan (an eminent practicing attorney and lecturer at Harvard) states there 
are two ways of approaching Article 9% We can look for andemploy our knowledge of 
whatls familiar or we can look for and accent what's different. Employing the first 
approa~h, Coogan. demonstrates that the fundamentals of Article 9 are easily and 
quickly grasped by "security lawyersn. (Coogan, A lazy Lawyer's Guide to Secured 
'fTansa.ctions Under the Code, 60 Mich. L. Rev.685:')- --
--------
Coogan suggests that lawyers continue to think in terms of traditional security 
devices when employing Article 9 with respect to secured transactions. 
We will attempt to show below how the more common traditional (Virginia)secured 
transactions would come into existence and be handled under Article 9. 
Let us stipulate, however, that; the oversimplifications which follow will inevi t-
ably conceal some difficult problems which could arise under Article 9(the problems 
concealed are equally or more difficult under present law). 
B. General Observati~ ~~ Essentiat Definitions. 
No amount of magic or oversimpHficatlon can conceal the fact that Article 9 is 
complex (but so is present security law), so some minimum of definition and back-
ground is essential to even a simplified illustrated exploration of Article 9. 
1. The concepts of 11 title11 and lien are not employed in the determination of rights. 
duties, and priorities in Article 9. 
2. Only the conceptual dividing lines between traditional security devices have 
been abandoned; the: approach is functional, that is, rights, duties, priorities turn 
on what pt1.rpose the security was intended to serve rather than the conceptual form of 
the s ecurity, ! . $.,., having the controversy turn upon whether a particular instr"Uillent 
was a chattel mortgage or a conditional sale does not happen under Article 9. 
3. The traditional te~1inology surrounding secured tr~nsactions has been largely 
abandoned--this to escare the existing judicial and legislative meanings given the 
old terminology. 
h. "Filing 11 (rooording ) under Article 9 does not necessarily 11 perfect11 the security 
interest. ---
5~ A nperfected11 security interest under Article 9 will not always have priority 
over another security interest. However, a nperfected11 (aooo'tfierWlse valid) 
security interest(in the original security) will ahrays wi thstand attack by lien 
creditors and a trustee in bankrllptcy{to ·che fullest extent to 1-1hich state law ·can 
afford the latter protection). 
6. Article 9 contains three distinct methods of 11 perfectingn security interest: (1) taking possession (2) filing (3) doing nothing ("automatic perfection") BUT: 
The method or methods of "perfectingtt permj.tted under Article 9 turn upon the nature 
of the security, and/or the use to which the security is to be put, 2..·~·' is the 
security a television set being purchased by retailer, or by a consumer?--or is it 
a warehouse receipt? 
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7 o No secured creditor should .be content with the security interest he has crea.tod 
until he pas thoroughly studied the sections of Article 9 dealing with priorities. 
These sections control his right !bo ultimate realization as much, or more so, than 
t.he sections dealing with creation and .,perfection" of the security interest. 
8. Article 9 enables a secured creditor to claim a security interest in thenpro 
ceeds11 of the orj_ginal security, e.g., the conditional sales contract obtaine<i by 
an automobile dealer when selling to a consumer would be "proceeds" as regard3 a 
secured party whose original security interest was obtained by 11'floor-planning11 the 
autos for the dAaler. (Extending the security interest to ttproceeds" is not entirely 
novel; the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, already Vir~nia law, extends the security 
interest to !!proceeds". Incidentally, any lawyer familiar >'l'i th the Trust Receipts 
Act will have a relatively easier task of understanding Article 9). Article 9 ex-
tends the "proceedsn concept to all security interests; in so doing, entirely new 
(and difficult) priority problems have been created. 
9. The "security agreementn and a nfinancing statement" are not the same; they 
have different purposes. But a 11 securi ty agreement~' may be used as a 11financing 
statement". 
Thus alerted to the more obvious quirks of Article 9, we proceed to the minimum 
of definitions essential to basic undertanding of the A1·ticle. For brevity and 
simplicity, the definitions will be by way of factual illustration and/or in terms 
of present law, when practiG~blez 
11
·Qoodsn--tangible personal property. 
'fhere are four types of 11 goodsn in Article 9·M 
nconsumergoods11 -a tele·vision set, a-t.:.toj furniture,etc., being held for personal 
use. 
---.,·Farm products"-things groim or produced by and held by a farmer-wheat, eggs, 
etc., in the hands of the fro·mer. 
"EquiPment":machinery in a plant, furniture in an office, an auto used primarily 
for business, etc. 
11 Inventory"-the things being manufa.c·cured by a manufacturer, also cars, televis-
ions, hardware, clothing or o~her merchandise being offered for sale to consumers 
by r etailers. 
"Instruments"-a negotiable instrument O!' a se~urity (Ar·i:,i~le 8) other than a 
document of title, e.g., a demand negotiable note. 
"Document"-a document of ti-l:.le such as a bill of lading o:..~ a warehouse receipt. 
•'Chattel paper"-a conditional sale contract or a chattel mortgage. 
nAccount"-an unsecured unconditional rie;ht to receive money aris i ng from a sale 
of goods or services-the traditional 17 c:>.cccuntt::J r oce:!.vable". 
"Contract. right11 -an unsecured conditiom.l right to receive money-a builder's 
contract right to payment when, aiicfif' he 'completes the building. 
nGeneral intangibles'-any form of intangible personal property not previously 
mentioned above-copyrights, trademro·ks, patents, and the like. 
THE METHOD, OR METHODS , OF PERFECTION, PLACE OF FILING, AND PRIORITY ALL TURN ON 
THE ABOVE CLASSIFICAT.ION3 OF PROPERTY--HENCE, IT COULD H1'LL BE SAID 'I'HAT THESE 
CLASSIFICATIONS(ALONG W'I'fE THE PURCHASE HONb"Y CONCEPT BEJ.,OW) APE AR'riCLE 9' s SUB"" 
STITUTE FOR 'I'rffi PRESENT LAW'S CONCEPTUAL METHOD OF DISTINGUISHING AMONG THE VARIOUS 
SECURITY DEVICES. 
"Purchaser money security i nterest11 -A security interest taken or retained by a 
seller to secure the price or a ser~uri ty interest taken by a. lender of money whose 
loan has enabled a person to acquir e personal property--a bank loan made directly 
to a consumer and used by the consumer to purchase an automobile, the bank taking a 
chattel mortgage as security for its loan. 
c. A Brief Afilysis of How Some Common Virginia Secured Transactions Would 
Be --craBsi ed andTreatedlJnder Article r.-
2lo 
lo Conditional Sale.(a) (at retail level-other than automobile)-A consumer buys a 
refrigerator fromaCiealer and secures the price with a condi ti.onal sale. Under 
Article 9 this would be classified as a purchase-money security interest in comsmner 
goods. The security agreement must be in W!'it.irig-to13'e valid even between-t'Fi'edeaier 
and the consumer (a change in Virginia law) but any writing which evidences an in-
tant to secure the transaction, describes the coiiateral, and is signed by the con-
sumer-~debtor is sufficient(#9-203). Thus, existing forms may be used. The dealer 
does not have to file anything--his security interest is perfected without filing 
(automatic perfection) (#,9-302). The only risk the dealer runs by not filing is 
that he could lose -his security interest if the consumer sold the refrigerator to a 
person without actual knowledge of the security interest and that person used the 
refrigerator for his personal-use(not a second hand dealer~ for example); even this 
slight risk is eliminated ffthe dealer wishes to, and does in fact, fiJ.e.(#9-307(2)) 
The consumer runs no risk of buying sub,ject to an existing security interest 
against the dealer's stock in trade; even if he knows of such interest he cuts it 
off. (#9··307 (1)). 
In the event of default the dealer may peaceably repossess, sue for the balance, 
repossess by legal action, etc o (f/#9 ... 503, 9-504, 9-505, 9-506). He may sell at 
public sale and in certain instances (and this ms one of them) he may sell at private 
sale(9-504(3))o The dealer's expenses of repo~session, storing, selling, and 
reasonable attorney's fees may be added to the debt (#9-504(l)(a)). However, if the 
consumer has paid 60% or more of the purchase price, or the loan, the consumer may 
request a public sale (#9-.505(1)). Unless the dealer and consumer agree that the 
dealer will accept the collatera~ in satisfaction of the debt, the dealer has a right 
to a deficiency judgment (f#/9-504(2),9-505(2)). (These are changes in present 
Virginia law-giving clearer and better rights to bo·i;,h dealer and consumer). 
(b) Conditional sale-at retail level-automobile-Same as (a) above except the exist-
of the security interest must be noted on the title certif~cate to become'perfected. 
NH-302(3)(b)). Remedies or-dealer and consumer-are-the same as-in (a) above. 
(c) Conditional sale contract or purchase-money chatt el mortgage or deed of trust-
assigned or sold to bank or other lending instttution by dealer. Illustration--
appliance dealer sells or assigns his conditional sales contract to banko 
Under Article 9 this transaction w~uld be classified as a security interest in 
chattel paper. The bank need not ex.:.mine for prior filings by other lenders; tiie 
bank willtake the contracts free of any existing securi.ty interest unless it had 
actual knowledge of a prior security interest(first '>entence, lf9 .. J08). The bank stepE 
into the shoes of its assignor insofar as method of filing} perfection priority and 
method of realizing upon the security, as against creditors of and purchasers from 
the consumer who purchased from the dealer. However, as against creditors of, or 
purchasers from: the ~~:r:_(the bank's assignor), the bank needs to perfect itha 
security interest in the chattr-11 paper. Thls perfection may be accomplished in 
either of two ways: if the bank retains possession of the conditional sales contraots 
its security interest. is perfected by possession (#9-305); if the bank chooses to 
give possession of the condi tional sale contracts to the dealer(for collection or 
other purposes)it may do so without the risk of' having the transaction declared void 
for failure to ttpolice" the collections(repeal of Benedict v. Ratner, 119-20.5) but 
now the bank must file a financing statement to perfect its securitY interest and 
even after filing the-bank runs a risk that a purchaser without notice of the con-
tracts left in the dealer's hands will cut off the bank ' s security interest (#9-308). 
The bank can eliminate this risk by stamping the conditional sales contracts (the 
nchattel papern) in such a way as to indicate its security interest. The bank is 
given a limited security lnterest in the money collected by the dealer from the 
consumer--as "proceeds" of the origim.l security (1!9-306). 
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Al l of the above observations also apply to a conditional sale contract >{hich i~ i n 
the form of a lease .. 
2 .. Chattel Mortgage ~ Chattel ~~ ~ Trust~-
(a)~As security for purchase money at retail level-other than automobiles~-
Under Article 9 this would be classified as a purchase money security interest in 
consumer goods. Hence, all the observations and rules ~stated-in part. l(aTa'bove -
relative to-oQnditional sales would be applicable. The difference in the conceptual 
~~ of tho security would make no difference in operation and result. 
(b) As security for pure~ monel at retail ~-automobiles--
Under Article 9, same rule and results as under l(b) above or conditional sales. 
(c) Chattel mo~~age ~~an purcha~~ money. This is the orthodox use of the 
chattel mortgage. Under Articfe 9 rights,cruties, priorities will turn upon the 
further question of the type of fioods which the chattel mortgage secures. That is, 
are the egoods "consumer gooastr; equipment" or 11 farm products" (under present 
Virginia law no lender in his right mind would use a chattel mortgage against in-
ventory--it would be a fraudulent com•eyance). ·- -
Illustration-An owner of a fully paid• for pleasure boat borrows and uses the boat 
as security. Under Article 9 this would be classified as a ttsecu.rity interest in 
consumer ~oJdz" (not purchase money). (#9-109(1))~ The lender should check for prior 
filings(/1 - 1 ) • The signif1.cant difference in the handling of this secured trans-
action from those previously discussed is caused by its not bei ng a purchase money 
security interest; thus, even thouch nconsumer goods'• are i nvolved the lender's 
seourity interest; requires a fiUng t o bec:ome ttperfected" (f/ 9-302 (1) unless the 
lender takes possession of the boat (/!9··305'). A fiHng woui.d also be required to 
perfect nchattel mortgageu security interest in ifequipment" and ttfarm products11 • 
The lender's priority in the original secur:l.t.y(boat) would, ~re believe, be almost un-
assailable if prompt f iling had been made by the lender and the l ender had checked 
and found no prior filing(see #9 ... 312). (P~rhaps the security int erest would lose 
effect if the borrower were a boat dealer and placed this , his personal boat, in his 
i nventory.) 
(d) Assignment or sale of chattel morfgage to a buyer or lender--
' 
Under Article 9 the chattel mortgage 1rrould bo t:chatt€;1 pa?er". Thus as regards the 
rights, duties, priorities of the buyer or assignee of t he ~hattel mortgages, as 
against creditors of and purchaGers from the l €nder•s S9ller or assignor, the dis-
cussion in 1(~) aboYe on conditi onal sal es would be applicable in its enti rety. 
3. Trust Receipt Financing--
--- - ---
This form of financing is used in Virginia to f inance acquisi tion of i nventory by 
r etailers, particularly acquisition o.f large items such as autos , refrigerators,etc. 
It is often referred to aR lt f loor planning" , It may al so be used t o finance the 
acquisiti on of new mater ial f or manufacturer s. 
Probably its most typi.caJ use i s t o f i nance t he purchase by an auto dealer of his 
stock of new cars. vJe select thi s as our illustrati on. 
Under Arti cle 9 the "floor planni ngtt cf autos would be descr i bed as a purchase-
money s ecurit~· interest in inventory. The l ender should first check f or prior 
filings . De a er and l ender "'"lrii:le t have a writ ten securi ty agr eement. The lender 1 a 
securi ty interest cannot become perfected until a f i nanc i ng statement i s filed 
(tl9-302) unless the lender takes possession of the aut os (/l9:)o5). Filing can ante-
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date the advance of money. The financing statement is the same for all secu:r·ed 
t .cam:actions under Article 9-Cexcept iif'arm products"andf~.xtur'es); rt-must-contain 
t b0 address o"ftFi'e secured party, give the mailing address of the debtor, state the 
t ype of collateral, and be signed by the debtor (#9-402). This illustration affords 
a rT!ost appropriate instance for the financing statement to claim security interest in 
11 proccedsn from the sale of the automobile. (##9-402 (3 )(4), 9-306; but see 1!9-308). 
After this type of security transaction is "perfected" the lender has excellent 
priority as to the original security (#9-312) but one who lends against inventory 
will always lose to purchasers in the ordinary course of business (#9-307(1)). This 
latter is not a change in the present law. 
If in checking the recrods our lender had found that e.nothi'Sr lender's financing 
statement covered the same type collateral, he could still have financed the purchase 
of new c~rs for this dealer and obtained a valid security interest by giving the 
notice set forth in #9-312(3). Thus, Article 9 quite effectively pre~ents one 
financier from obtaining a monopoly in the financing of a customer's inventory. 
All that has been stated in this portion of the memorandum would be equally applic-
able to "floor-planning" refrigerators, stoves, television sets, etc. 
4. Accounts Receivable financing--
(a) Factoring type arrangeraen.t--retai1er or manufacturer procures money by a ttsale" 
or assignment of amounts due him by his customer. 
This lender should first check for prior filings. Lender and borrower must enter 
into a written security agreement (#9·203)o A security interest in accounts can be 
perfected only by filing unless the total of the assignments transfers only an 11 in-
significan·c par~of the outstanding accounts of the assignor 11 (#9-302(l)(d)). The 
best rule to follow is--~l 
A security interest in accounts is not rendered legally invalid because of failure 
of the lender to "police" collections and returned merchandise; Article 9 abolishes 
the rule of Benedict v . Ratner(#9u205). 
An assignment of an account is leg~lly effective even though no notice is given the 
account debtor but the account debtor may pay the assignor of the account and be 
discharged unless he, the account debtor, has been notified of the assugnment. 
(#9-318 (3). 
Quite frequently a large customer of the borrower will use a purchase order which 
prohibits assignments of that cus tomer 1s account. Article 9 expressly invalidates 
a clause prohibiting assignments (#9~ 318 (4) ar..d thus t he e::ds ting practice of some 
lending institutions to make loans on sutJh accounts is no longer clouded by legal 
uncertainty. 
(b) Bank ncharge plansn __ 
In essence, these plans are t:-rue sales of accounts, or non-recourse assignments of 
accounts; however they would be t reated as a security interest under Article 9--
a security interest in ac~ounts (#9·~102(l)(b). Thus, the discussion in 4(a) immed-
Iately above would befully applicable to such charge plans, or any other true sale 
of accounts. 
5. Agricultural ~ £!. .:!!...~ ~ ~ ~--
Under Article 9 these would be class ified as a security interest in farm products 
(##9-105(l)(f), 9-109(3). Unborn animals and growing crop~n be SUbjects of such 
security ihterests (#9-105(l)(f). An after-acquired property clause is limited in 
24. 
H,s effect to crops which become suc:h 't'rithin one year after the execution of the 
security interest except. where the sec,.trity agreement containing the after-acqu:!.red 
property clause was a purchase money or improvement deed of trust on the land itself 
{l/9-204(4)(a)) o 
The lender should check for prior filings. A security agreement in writing must be 
executed (119-203). A financing statement must be filed for "perfection", but here the 
financing statement must contain one additional piece of information: it must des-
cribe the land on which the crops are growing or are to be grown(##9-402(1),9-402(3) 
2). The place of' filing a financing statement for "farm products" includes the 
county in which the crops are growing or are to be grown (#9-401-optional). 
The l~nder who makes loans on crops, etc.( 11farm products") is given a preferred 
p0si'tiion insofar as protection against purchasers is concerned: a purchaser in 
ordinary course of business does not buy frse of a perfected security interest when 
he buys directly from the farmer 'W9-307(1). 
A lender making an enabling advance against C!'Ops not more than three months before 
planting is given a very limited priority over lenders whose security interest in 
the crop did not result from an enabling advance (#9-312(2). However, if this 
priority is not satisfactory to a lender making an enabling advance, Article 9 
recognizes the validity of a subordination agreemant, and thus the enabling lender 
(with the consent of the lender ha·lfing a higher priority)could advance his priority 
(1/9 ... 316). 
6. Pledges--
(a) Tangible personal prop9rty-- 11 goodsn--Illustration~-Pledge of diamond ringo 
Under Article 9 this would be, classified simply as a sectl.J:Oity~ :.tnterest in goods 
perfected by 12ossessi.2!!· The lender should checks fo'r prior l'i'llngs. The secu:rity 
agreement is effective even though not in writing(/?9··203(a)). No filing is required; 
the securi~y interest is perfeoted bY--possession; however the lender may also perfect 
by filing (##9-305,9"302), 
The rights, duties and remedies on default are clearly spell6d out in Article 9 
(/1#'9-504, 9-506, 9-507, 9..,207) • 
If our lender found no prior filing his security interest would, it seems, have 
top priority (#9M312(5)(6))o 
(b) Bills of lading and warehouse receipts--"Documen~s" ., 
Under Article 9 the>se pledges would oe classified as Eecuri ty interests ~ ~­
~ E_Srfectl'3d El possess~. 
If the documents are negotiable, and have been nduly negotiated" to our lender, 
then our lender need not check for a prior filing (t/11'9-309, 9-304 (1)). 
Again, no written security agreement is legally required (#9-205(1)) but the lend-
er would be Wiseto reduce the tran:Jaction to writing because these documents will 
ultimately leave the lender's possession and the lender mlght desire a perfected 
security interest for a period longer than his period of possession plus twenty-one 
days, and our lender might wish to ~laim "proceeds" and perfect his interest in 
proceeds for a period longer than thirty~one days~ (See ##9-304(5) and (6) and 
9-306(3)). 
Again, the security interest is perfected by possession, and, in addition, it is 
perfected for twenty-one days after a release of possession if the release of 
possession was for the usual bus iness purposes (#9-304(5)). This latter isnautomatic 
perfection." 
25. 
During the period of time the documents are out of the lender's pcssession he runs 
the risk of losing his security interest by due negotiation to a holder, that is, 
transfers to one who is a 11holder in due course11 (~-309). This is not a change in the 
law. The lender may protect himself by notation on the document or by seeing to it 
that the borrower has no opportunity to n~gotiate the document. 
Filing, although not necessary, is advisable because of the limited duration of 
perfection as to the document and its proceeds (ff#9-304(5) and (6) and 9•306(3))o 
The filing can precede the advances. 
Priority is excellent so long as possession is retained and for twnty-one days there-
after(with the exception noted above (#9-312(5)(a). 
(c) Negotiable paper-11 Instruments"-Illustration-pledge of a negotiable note., 
Under Article 9 a pledge of negotiable paper would be described as a securi~ in-
terest in instrun1ents perfected ~ possession. The bank need not cheCk for prlor-
filings-t~-309). 
No written security agreement is legally necessary (#9-203(l)(a)). The security 
interest is perfected by taking possession (f/9-305). There is no advantage gained by 
filing; possession and "automatic perfetJtion11 are the only ways of perfecting a 
security interest in negotiable paper (#9-304(1)(4)(5)):--The lender's rights will 
turn largely upon Article 3 on Commerchl.l Paper. 
Some rights and duties of the lender are set out in #f/9~207 and 9-504. 
Again, top priority seemslikelYso long as possession has not terminated, twenty-one 
days thereafter has not elapsed, and a holder in due course has not acquired rights 
(##9··312(5)(b) and 9··309). 
(d) t1Field warehousing" 
This is essentially a pledge of the goods. If the field warehouse is t"bona-fidett 
there would be no need of filing under the Code. However, a lender may wish to have 
a written security agreement and file a financing statement as insurance against a 
creditor-successfully proving-rhat the field warehouse was not bona-fide, in which 
event, the lender fs security interest would be defeated unless he could show that 
under the Code he had 11 an existing security i nterest in inventory--perfected by 
filing. 11 To the extent that field wu.rebousing involves the issuance and pledge of 
docwnents of title the previous discus sion on pledges is applicable. 
7. 11 Lay~awaytt ' plans--
Illustrations--consumer buys a dress from a merchant and the merchant retains 
possession of the dress until &11 installments have been paid. 
There is at present no satisfactory law in Virgi nia covering this security device. 
Unfairness and harsh forfeitures ar e too frequent. 
Under the Code this "seller 's lien" in a 11lay-·awaytt (which arises under #2-703 
(a) of Article 2) is a 11 s ecurity interest11 under Articl e 9 (#9-112). Clear, and 
obstensibly fai r, rules ar e l aid down in Article 9 for the adjustment of a contro-
versy between a ttlay-away11 merchant and his cus tomer (#f/9-.r;r!~ through 9-507) o 
8. Fixtures--Illustratlon--furnace in a home. 
Arti cle 9 provides for a seourity interest in fixtures but does not define the term . 
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There can be no security interest under Article 9 as regards lumber, brick, tile, 
and the like which are incorporated into a building (l/9··313). 
The security interest in fixtures must be evidenced by a written security agreement 
(//9-203(l)(b)). Perfection is achieved by fi~ng a financing statement (#9-302(1)). 
The financing statement must also contain a description of the land on which the 
fixture is located (#9-402(1)). The financing statement is filed and indexed with 
mortgages and deeds of trust on land (19-401). 
A )erfecte~ se~urity interest in fixtures has priority over: 
(a a purchaser for value of the realty 
(b) a £rior encumbrance on the realty but only to the extent of advances made by 
the realt~nder after perfection of the-security interest in fixtures. 
(c) a lien creditor subsequent to perfection of the security interest in fixtures. 
BUT-When a holder of a security interest in fixtures exercises his priority over 
persons having an interest in the realty he must reimburse any (non-consenting) 
holders of an interest in the realty for the cost of ar,y repair of any physical in-
jury caused the realty by the removal of the fixtures (1!'9;..313 (1-.5')). 
IIo UNSECURED SELLERS AND ARTICLE 9 
The belief that under present law unsecured sellers have a residuum of unencumber-
ed assets for realization of their clai!'ns is probably illusory to a large degree. 
Under present law all the stock-in-trade, equipment, and accounts of a retailer 
can be encumber.ed: Trust Receiptst Conditional Sales of equipment, Consignments, 
Factoring, and assignment of accounts receivable, when combined, can, even today, 
encumber all the assets of a retailer. 
The only change made by Article 9, in this regard, is that it's easier to encumber 
all the assets, and if the lender is "piggish" he can now legally claim a "floating11 
lien which covers a.fter· .. acquired property. 
Will lenders be npiggish11 if the Code is adopted? The experience in Pennsylvania 
has shown they will not. In addition, if the lender attempts to make full use of 
his legally permissible right to "tie up his borrower11 the lender is likely to find 
hts security up.-set, in bankrupt~y. See Cooga.n, The Effect of the Uniform Commerci-
~2: Cod~ !!I~on Receiva?les ~~?:.~!l--~~~ Answers ~ncf SomeunresOIVeci Problems, 76 
HARV. L. RI:V. ~9(19D3). This could help explain why lender-s operating under the 
Code have not proved "piggish11 o 
One further polnt should be made. Under the Code a security interest is so easily 
and cheaply created and perfected tha.t any seller who has doubts as to unsecured 
credit could become a secured creditor. 'l'he manufacturer supplying the small re-
tdler could himself achieve se~ured priority over a "floating lien" by (1) giving 
notice, (2) obtaining a written security D.greement from his retailer(the seller's 
order blank would suff ice) with the additi on of one sentence), and (3) filing once 
(which would cover a chain of transactions ). (See #9-312(3). ----
III. A PROBlEM AREA OF' ARTICJ~E 9 
The priorities sections of Article 9 have been shown by some writers to (1) not 
answer all priority problems, ar.d (2) not always protect the interest which is more 
vital to the business community. 
Suffice it to say that generally the criticisms are directed to results reached in 
hypothetically possible, but rare situ.ations created by the critics. And, generally 
speaking, until the prior·ities sections are amended after extensi.ve study, lenders 
can avoid the defioiences of Article 9's priority sections by exercising diligence. 
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Additionally, it can be stated that it is conflicting claims to "proceeds" w·hich 
most loudly is said to demand further consideration and amendment. These are 
pr oblems the existing law does not pretend to answer. 
IV . SUGGESTED A!1EI\1DMENTS 
We do not recomnend any significant departure from the language of this Article. 
However~ we s'lggest two minor amendments as follows: 
#9-104. This section exempts certain transactio~from the Article on Secured Trans-
actions, which, among other provisions, prevents enforcement of a contract clause 
prohibiting assignment of a debtor's rights in collateral. Among the exemptions is 
11 a transfer of an interest or claim in or under any policy of insurance". We propose 
to add the following language: 11 or cont!'act for an annuity, including a variable 
annuity': ·Th ; s h aj b ·~ e.. n cl v ·n ~:. 
This will prevent an unfortunate or improvident person from losing or di.ssipating 
rights in an annuity contract which he may have spent years in accumulating against 
the needs of his old age. · 
#9-302. Paragraphs (1) (c) and (1) (d) of this section require that a financing 
statement be filed to protect a purcho.eG mor!e;y ee~urity interest in a motor vehicle. 
This is inconsistent with another provi:sion of the same section, and we propose the 
deletion of this requirement. ( ::r:r /) () " 1 •. ·C::~ 'y . A o / ~.) 7-<.:' A.) 
... ~ -\ ) l.ic e: 11 ,;-{"-. r_ rv1 
Virginia law requires a notice of lien to be placed on the certificate of title 
of a motor vehicle and gives adequate prote~tion to crer:iitors. 
ARTICLE 10 
EFFECTIVE DATE--TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Thi~ Article fixes the effectiv~ date of the Uniform Commercial Code, provides for 
repeal of prior uniform acts and inconsistent statutes, and se"cs forth certain laws 
not to be affected or repealed by adoption of the Code~ 
1966-THE MORE IMPORTANT STATUTORY CHANGES AFFECTING BAR EXAMINATION 
SUBJECTS 
1. Cha pter 140 of the Acts of As s embly gives the governing body of 
every county the power to provlde motor vehicle liability insurance 
for the purpose of protecting all operatfurs of motor vehicles owned 
or leased by the county. 
2 . D ~ rrn ination of Motor Vehicles Lia b i lit y I n sura n ce Policies --
V#38 .1-70 . 9 . No c ontra ct of liabil i t y insur ance cove r ing the 
oper a t ion of a motor ve ll icle whi ch h•::ts be e11 in e f fe ct fo r s ixty 
da ys sha ll be t erminate d by t he insur er by ca n cella t i on or f a ilur e 
to renew, exc e pt fo r no npa yme nt of pr emium, unless the i nsurer 
r.; ive s the na med il"J.sur ed _g_g_t i c ~ i n !!!._i t i rrJI ~:1. t l.~ th i rt y da ys 
prior t o t he pro pos ed da t e of t erminat i on; 
(a ) That it proposes to te r mi na te by canc ella t i on or f a ilure 
to r enew the i n sura n ce cont r a ct upon su ch da t e ; a nd 
(b ) That t he n&rn ed insur ed, with i n f i f te en da y s a fter t he 
ma i ling of such notic e , ma y, a t hi s option , r eques t t he i n sur e r 
to furni sh a writt en BY- pl a nation of .it s s pe cif i c r eason or r eason s 
f or t e r minating or f a il ing t o r en ew- ; a nd .. 
(c) That, upon r e ce ipt of a writt en r eaues t fro m t h e named 
insure d~ i t wil l fon; hvlith ma il t o the name d i nsure d such writ ten 
explanation. 
V#38 .1-70 .10. If the name d i nsured ex erci se s h i s opt i on t o r equest 
a n expl a nation t h e insure r for t hwit h , but i n a ny event prior t o the 
da t e of the propos ed t ur mi nation or failur e to r enew, mail t o tho 
named insur ed a wr i t t en expla nation, giv~ng the r oDs on or r ea sons 
for it s f a ilure to r enew t he cont r a ct. 
V#3 8 .1 - · 70 ~t . An expl a na t i on f urnished i n a ccordance wi t h 38 . 1-70 .10 
sha ll be pr i vi l eg(:! d, a nd sha ll n ot const i tut e gro und "' f or any caus e 
of a ction a:p i nst t he insur er or i t s r epr es ent a tives or a ny f irm, 
par s on or corpo r~t i on who in good f a i th f urn i sh es t o the i n sur er 
t h e i nforma t i on upon vih i ch t he r easons a r e ~ ~ a se d . 
V//3 8.1- 70 .12 . Tho provi s :t on s of 38 . 1 -70 . 9 to '38 . 1 -70 . 11 shal l n ot 
a pply to poli c i es of lia b i l it y i n surance i ssu ed under any a ss i gned 
r i sk pla n est a b l i sh ed i n conf ormi t y with 3 8 .1- 2 6 ~. 
V//38 . 1 -70 .13 . ~'lh on a ny pol i cy of insuranc e covering liab il i ty 
a r i s i ng out of t ho ownL r shl p , ma i nt enan ce or u se of any motor 
vehic l e i s ca nc 0l L .d or t r1r. ina t uu t lw ins ure r or h i s agent sha l l 
r e port su ch f'.l ct t o t ho Commi ss i oner of the Divi s i on of Moto r 
Vehi cl es wi thin f i f t een days of t ho canc e l l at i on t he r eof . 
3 . Vl/38 .1-31+9 r educe s t he time puriod i n t he 11 i n cant e8t i bl e clau s e 11 
of acc i dent a nd s ickness policy pr ovi s i on s fro m 3 y0ar o to 2 year s . 
L~. V//-38 .1-36l.l. r cads : 11 No insurer having i ssu ed a policy of a cc i -
dent a nd s ickness i nsur anc e pur su~nt to t he provi s i ons of th i s 
a rt i cle sha l l dony liab ility on Rny cl aim ot he rw i se cov er ed und er 
such po licy be cau se of tho ex i st ence of a di sease or phys i ca l 
i mpa i rmunt or de f Lc t , congenita l or othe r wi se , a t t he time of the 
ma king of t he ap pl i aa tion fo r such pol i cy, unl ess i t b~ shown t ha t 
t h o a ppli cant know or mi ght r easona bly ha ve been ex pe cted to know 
of su ch d i s ease , impa i rment or dof e ct . 11 
p.2'0 
•966 tegislative Changea 5o' if - ,e.l-3el n uw ?e ~ds in part: . . ( al) l'lOr shall any such policy or contract relat1ng to. ovvnershl. [! , 
mc'.intenance or us0 of B. rr;,otor vehicle be so is:3ued or dell. vered ~.n­
less it contains an endorsement or provision insurincs the n :01.r;1ed :-n· · 
st~r0d r..my (and) other peTs on r;s f.! Onsi ble for the use of or &l£1 us1nr; 
t Le .:"otor vehicle with the consent, eX i)r -.:: s s or i1r:plied, of the na:·:ed 
i nsured, a Bainst liability for death or injury sustained, or loss or 
dau.age occasioned within tr1e cover <..1 .. '~e of t[je ~;olicy or contrStct as 
a r esult of negligence in the o;)erc:: tion or use of such vehicle by 
t he r.. ~, -.ed insur~d or oy 3.ny such re.rRon, ,;ot\\:i thstanJine t he failure 
or refusal of t .iJ.e na, ·. ed insured or such other ~)ersorL to coo)er ate 
with the insurer unde r t~e teru.s of t r",e l;olic;n provid2d, however!' 
th~ t if such failure or refusal rrejudices tha insurer in tne defense 
of an action for d ::.!.m&t;e s arising fro;u the OJ..! era tion or use of stlc.h 
motor vehicle, then this endorsement or provision shall be voido 
(a2) /~y endorsewentp provision or ridar attached to, or included 
in, any such r>olicy of insur-,·.nce wj! ich purports to seek in any way 
to lit.ti t or reduce in any respect the coverage af orded by tne pro-
visions required therein by tni s s0ction si .• c:.ll be wholly void. 
6~ V·L 46.1-400 provides thP-t accident ru :jorts must be laC:J.de to the 
Division of ~..otor Vehicles within 5 days or' t.he ac c id..e :_ t. if the .:>ro-
perty excevds ~100 (formerly t ne li1:d t W <~- s ;50). 
7. Under Chapter 24? the arr.ount constituting gr and lF.trceny ht:!S be ,~n 
raised from i50 to SlOO. 
8. v: ld.l-91 provides a penalty oi de Rth or life i~prisonm~nt for 
robbery with assault or put r. ing ~:: n~,' one in fe <-,.r of bodily h a rn,. 
9. V ~ lJ.l-69.1 (new) !Tl8.k ,;s it a ft:lony to set a Sl)ri r.. o- /;Wle :_rtlCre 
wa s f orllierly no Code provision relatincS to t.:..ny penalty for setting 
such L;,runs. 
10. / ; 46.1-190 (i) provides tnat reckless drivine sh aL l include 
driving 20 or uore ill)h above tiw .JOStdd lir1,i t or in excess of 80 utph 
re ;;;u.rdles ~'3 of t he J10St~Jd li :Hi t. r• 'ormerly tflC li;rli t wa3 75 m-oh and 
no u1ention ·:·os rr1 c..de as to an;: pa rticula r m,>h above the aP£>lica ble 
)Osted li111i ts. 
11. V lu.l-56.1 creates ti1e criuif: of dri vin ,-__, while un~:kr tile impair-
I:.ent of i n toxicants '.:l.Yld ~)rovia.es t .~at vm_;n alcoholic content in the 
blood is between .10 and .15 .), the presumption arises t ru~.t the ability 
of tne ac cused wc:..s i ilipaired w1 thin the meanin~ of t t1is st CJ.tute. 
12. vj 46.1-230 says t nat lt11e~t& where intersections of stre <~ ts con-
tain no lilarked crosswalks, pedestrians snall not be euilty 'to neg-
lic ence e s ~ ma tter of l aw for {Ril ur e to cros s ~t intersectioas. 
1966 lEGISLATIVE CHANGES 21. 
13. V/}46.1-22 (a) (4) (Nel:v ) provides that "The operator of any 
publicly owned vehicle operated by or under the direction of a 
police officer in chase of violate rs or suspects ••• may, without 
sub jecting himsielf to crimina l prosecution, pass· or overtake Hith 
due regard to the safety of persons and property, at any inter-
section1l This new section was occasioned by the decision in 
207 Va. 276 where a policeman was found contributor ily negli-
gen t . for overtaking a speeder 's car an an in tersec t:L cm .. That 
case was decided under Va#46,1-190 which provided 11 (e) a person 
shall be guilty of reckless driving who shall overtake or pass 
any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction, • .,at any in-· 
t ersection of highways.,.,and .... The provisions of t his Chapter, 
applicable to the driver of uelhicles on the high"V~ray, shall apply 
to drivers of all vehicles regard less of o"V~mership.,. ,tt 
l4a 'l'he underlined words wer e added to V//40 .... 61.2: In construction, 
maintenance, excavation and demolition work, ad equat e and suitable 
shoring and other safeguards shall be used whenever such work has 
progressed to the degree that dangers to the employeEs or general 
public may exist. 
15. By V//P, - 636 the maximum ar11ount recov~rab le in a ,yvrongful death a 
action has been raised from \:>3 5,000 to ~, 40,000. This is not retro-
active and takes effect as of July 1, 1966, 
16o Vi/f.8-4hl deletes the requirement that allegations be under oath i 
in suggestion for institution of garnishment proceedings .. 
17, Under V#g-199, counsel for either party may, on voir dire , exami 
mine jurors and as.k any relevant question to determine interes t, 
predjudice, or bias., Formerly counse]J had to petition"the court 
that this be d one and the court questioned the jurors. 
